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I .  INTRODUCTION
Indonesia’s approach to the independence movement in Papua has been to try to crush it, re-
press it, persuade it, co-opt it, divide it, dilute it or smother it in a process called development. 
Nothing has worked, and it has proved impossible to eradicate. It is too powerful an idea, backed 
by too much history and too many differences with the rest of Indonesia. The best policy the 
Indonesian government could adopt now would be the equivalent of “do no harm”, taking mea-
sures that will avoid further radicalisation. The most urgent is to invest in better policing. 
At the same time, the movement itself, generically known as the Free Papua Organisation 
(Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) has been so resistant to unification, so riven by clan and per-
sonal interests, that to this day, it has never constituted a serious threat, militarily or politically, 
to the Indonesian state. It consists of three elements: a disparate group of armed units, each with 
limited territorial control, that does not answer to a single commander; several groups inside 
Papua that through demonstrations and protests give expression to a much more widespread 
sense of injustice and resentment; and a small group of leaders based abroad, in the Pacific, 
Europe and the U.S., who try to raise awareness of Papuan issues with a view toward generating 
international support for independence. 
The political fronts have never been able to direct the armed units, and the armed units them-
selves have generally tended to work out a wary co-existence with local governments, headed by 
directly elected Papuans. The conflict is of such low intensity that the government can easily live 
with it. The guerrillas have never done enough damage for the government to seriously consider 
negotiations, and many parties have an interest in sustaining the low-level threat.
Faced with this situation, the political groups have adopted different tactics. The largest, most 
radical, and most dynamic, the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, 
KNPB) has consciously tried to follow what it sees as the lessons of East Timor: provoke violence 
on the part of security forces and hope that international outrage over human rights violations 
resulting will change international reluctance to intervene, much as a massacre in East Timor in 
1991 changed the political dynamics there. Any repressive action by the Indonesian government 
thus plays directly into the KNPB’s hands. (As one KNPB leader said, “That’s exactly what we 
want, lots of police abuses against us.”)1
Others would prefer to follow the Aceh model: press the Indonesian government for nego-
tiations, mediated by an international third party. But the conditions in Aceh that produced a 
peace agreement in 2005, ending a three-decade insurgency, were vastly different to those in 
Papua, and Indonesian agreement to an outside mediator is unthinkable. 
The diaspora elites have only rarely managed to overcome longstanding divisions that date 
back to the early 1970s, but determination to become a member of the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group, an association of Pacific nations, gave them a clear short-term goal, resulting in the for-
mation of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) in December 2014 (and 
eventual observer status, not membership, in 2015). The unity may be temporary, but for the 
moment it has given a new confidence to the movement; whether it can set other equally prac-
tical short-term goals and deliver remains to be seen. 
The same could be said of the Indonesian government. President Jokowi has made a point of 
trying to show he cares about Papua by making repeated visits, releasing a few political prisoners 
and promising to free more, and committing the central government to several major develop-
ment projects. But the president and his advisers need to understand that these steps, however 
welcome, will not necessarily translate into support for the government. More roads, schools and 
houses, while desirable on their own terms, will not make pro-independence sentiment disappear. 
1  “Polres Dilarang Akomodir Kegiatan KNPB”, Cenderawasih Pos, 10 April 2015.
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In the face of an emboldened and at least temporarily united political movement, the gov-
ernment also needs to understand some of the drivers of radicalisation and avoid exacerbating 
them. They include ineffective policing, where a frequent default response to any sign of trouble 
is to open fire; impunity for security forces, which fuels the sense of injustice; and a practice of 
undermining local customary institutions if they are suspected of pro-independence sympathies. 
Ultimately, Jakarta needs to learn to live with an independence movement that may be best 
managed by not trying to destroy it.   
II .  WHAT IS THE OPM?
The Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) is an umbrella term for the pro-independence move-
ment engaged since 1965 in a struggle for Papuan independence. While its name literally trans-
lates as the Free Papua Organisation, it is best understood as a highly decentralised movement, 
composed of factions working as much in competition with one another as in coordination. 
There is no single armed front that reports to a political wing nor any shared strategy. On pro-in-
dependence websites and in comments to the press, members present the familiar image of a 
guerrilla army, with a supreme commander presiding over regional commands that span the 
provinces of Papua and Papua Barat. But in practice, a combination of varied clan and ethnic 
loyalties, marked class differences, personal enmities, remote terrain and different agendas have 
made a single chain of command impossible. Units and commanders rise and fall without much 
communication with one another. 
This report uses the term “armed OPM” to refer to combatants as opposed to political activ-
ists, discussed later in this report. Most armed OPM are based inside Papua, but a few take refuge 
across the border in Papua New Guinea. Factions go by different names but most use some variant 
of the name National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, TPN) or TPN/OPM. 
The distinction between armed and political groups is not a perfect one. Some leading mem-
bers of the armed OPM fled in the 1980s and now run political groups abroad; some of the po-
litical activists have used violence. Each of the three leading pro-independence coalitions—the 
West Papua National Authority (WPNA), the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation 
(WPNCL) and the Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB)—has tried and failed to unify the 
armed OPM and place it under political leadership. The establishment in December 2014 of the 
ULMWP has brought an unprecedented and probably temporary degree of unity to the move-
ment, but there is still no evidence that its leaders are inclined or have the capacity to direct the 
strategy of the armed factions. 
Several factors make it difficult to come up with a reliable estimate of the size of the armed 
OPM. Membership is constantly shifting; for every actively engaged fighter, there are many more 
sympathisers. The authority and influence of individual commanders is a product of their status 
within existing clan and community structures. There are also frequent allegations of “fake” 
OPM units set up by the government to challenge or discredit the real ones. One leaked 2009 as-
sessment reportedly prepared by the army special forces, Kopassus, estimated the total number 
of armed OPM as 1,532, “able to conduct a guerrilla war/survive in the forest, spread throughout 
almost every regency in Papua”.2 This estimate would likely be lower today, particularly if it were 
restricted to those pursuing violence against the state. The geographical range it suggests would 
also be far more limited: there is virtually no OPM violence anywhere in Papua Barat province 
2 See “Anatomy of Papuan Separatists”, undated document available at images.theage.com/au/file/2011/08/13/2555328?Ko-
passus2011.pdf and Human Rights Watch, “Indonesia: Military Documents Reveal Unlawful Spying in Papua”, 14 August 
2011. The assessment named twenty separate groups that ranged in size from thirteen to 460. Its authenticity has not been 
verified.
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or in the southern districts of Papua. 
This report looks at the role and activities of thirteen different factions conducting armed 
violence in three areas of Papua province: Mimika district; the eastern central highlands and the 
north coast. While it is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of active OPM, these are the only 
factions known to be actively engaged in violent attacks.
One of the primary obstacles to a coherent military structure has been the inability to agree 
on a single chief commander. Today, at least three men in different areas actively claim the title:
• Goliat Tabuni, based in Tingginambut, Puncak Jaya district, is probably the strongest with 
the most extensive territorial coverage. To varying degrees, other commanders based in 
neighbouring Puncak, Paniai and Mimika operate under his direction. 
• Puron Wenda is a commander based in neighbouring Lanny Jaya who broke away from 
Goliat around 2010, hoping to make his name by launching more attacks. In May 2015, 
declaring a “total revolutionary war”, his men claimed to have brought Goliat and others 
under his command, but there is no evidence to support this.3 
• Richard Hans Yoweni, based in Papua New Guinea but with influence along the northern 
coast, is involved in almost no violence. He is titular head of the West Papua National Co-
alition for Liberation, a Vanuatu-based lobby group, whose supporters recognise him as 
the OPM’s overall leader. He replaced Mathias Wenda in that role in 2008.
Because the various commands retain different links to political groups in and outside Pap-
ua, different versions of a command structure have emerged on websites, in the media, and in 
government reports. Most feature a supreme commander (panglima tertinggi) with a chief of 
staff and other senior officials, sitting atop a structure of regional defence commands (komando 
daerah pertahanan, Kodap). The number of these Kodap varies, but their common feature is 
that unlike the territorial structure of the Indonesian military that they appear in some ways to 
mimic, they are based not on Indonesian administrative districts (kabupaten), but instead on 
Papua’s areas of shared traditional custom (wilayah adat) that once also formed the basis for 
the Dutch colonial administrative divisions.4 Many of the armed OPM factions have coalesced 
along ethnic lines, another factor that has hampered broader unity.
If the exact size of the OPM is difficult to estimate, it is nevertheless clear that it poses no 
serious military threat. The insurgency remains low-intensity, with relatively few fatalities from 
armed encounters that most often take the form of isolated hit-and-run attacks. With 144 re-
ported fatalities between 2009 and 2014, separatist conflict in Papua is far less deadly than the 
Aceh insurgency was at its peak in the early 2000s, when annual deaths surpassed 2,500.5 In 
many areas, local officials appear to have worked out a means of largely peaceful coexistence 
with the local OPM that involves various forms of patronage. 
Since the fall of Soeharto, the Indonesian government has shown no serious interest in cap-
turing OPM leaders, although it would not be hard to do: they and their camps are for the most 
3 “OPM Declares Open War on Security Forces, Non-Papuan Civilians”, Jakarta Globe, 22 May 2015.
4 Netherlands New Guinea was divided into six divisions (afdeeling): Hollandia (now Jayapura), Geelvink Bay (now the 
islands of Biak and Serui), Central New Guinea (which covered the area from Paniai east to the mostly unadministered 
central highlands, now known as Puncak Jaya), South New Guinea (now Merauke and surrounding districts), Fak-Fak 
(which also covered Kaimana and Mimika) and West New Guinea (Sorong, Manokwari and Raja Ampat). These divisions 
loosely followed what Papuans call the wilayah adat. 
5 These included 43 suspected OPM killed by security forces, 27 soldiers and 20 police killed by suspected OPM, and 39 ci-
vilians killed by suspected OPM. The “civilians” category is problematic because it includes a large number of non-Papuan 
motorcycle taxi (ojek) drivers widely suspected to be state intelligence agents. Figures based on data compiled from the 
National Violence Monitoring System (www.nvms-indonesia.com), whose data is in turn based on local media reporting—
they should be seen as rough estimates. In particular, it is likely that figures on suspected OPM killed by security forces is 
significantly under-reported. 
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part well-known. Several factors explain this failure.
From the military’s point of view, there is no incentive to risk life and limb in difficult terrain 
to capture men who pose little danger to the state. Neither the police nor the military venture 
very far beyond established posts. Even at the height of the Aceh insurgency, the capture or 
killing of top GAM leaders was rare, but involvement in military operations in Aceh was at least 
seen as an important stepping stone to promotion in the officer corps. No such prestige has been 
attached to Papua operations since the 1970s.
A second reason is that since the mid-2000s, the police have gradually taken over from the 
military as the lead agency in counter-insurgency, but they have no capacity for jungle opera-
tions. Using a “persuasive” approach—trying to convince commanders to cooperate with the 
government through offers of cash and jobs—has become the only practical option, as well as 
being more palatable from a public relations point of view. 
A third explanation is that many different interests benefit from the conflict. When local 
politicians were campaigning for the creation of Puncak district, to be carved out of Puncak 
Jaya, one of the arguments they used is that the new district would diminish support for the 
insurgency because it would bring government closer to the people.6 Without periodic violence, 
this argument would have no traction. The background threat of violence helps security forces 
obtain extra funding for “insecure areas” (daerah rawan); and they can use staged “surrenders” 
as proof that such funding produces results. Sporadic violence also helps justify extra funding 
for securing local and national elections.7
Unscrupulous business contractors and the district governments that hire them can also ben-
efit by citing force majeure—in the form of OPM threats or attacks—as a reason for not finishing 
government-funded projects. The money budgeted for the project can then be written off.
For all these reasons, the armed OPM has never been eliminated or, since the fall of Soeharto, 
even seriously engaged. At the same time, its own divisions prevent it from growing into a more 
serious threat, even with access to new arms and resources. Those divisions are in part a func-
tion of Papua’s difficult terrain and complex clan structure, but they are also rooted in history.
III .  A FRACTURED HISTORY
The pro-independence movement, armed and unarmed, has its roots in the belief that Papuan 
independence was promised by the Dutch colonial administration in 1961, but that this goal was 
then thwarted by Indonesia through fraud and violence, with the tacit approval of the U.S. and 
other western powers. Earlier, Indonesia’s successful war of independence against the Nether-
lands (1945-49) had not secured the last remaining territory of the Dutch East Indies for the new 
republic. Western New Guinea remained a colony and the Dutch began preparing it for self-gov-
ernment, including with the establishment in 1961 of the Nieuw-Guinea Raad (New Guinea 
Council), a proto-legislature in which several men later to be prominent in the OPM participated. 
In less than a year, however, American pressure and Indonesian military actions had succeeded 
in persuading the Netherlands to cede the territory, now called West Irian, to a period of United 
6 Cornelis Lay and Purwo Santioso (Eds.), Perjuangan Menuju Puncak: Kajian Akademik Rencana Pembentukan Kabupaten 
Puncak Pemekaran Kabupaten Puncak Jaya Propinsi Papua (Yogyakarta, 2006).
7 Providing security for elections in Papua means big money. In 2014, the Papua police command (until December 2014, 
there was one command for both provinces) received roughly Rp. 90 billion (then worth roughly $8 million) from the cen-
tral government and Rp. 20 billion ($1.7 million) from the provincial government’s budget for elections security. “Berbagai 
Antisipasi Keamanan Papua Jelang Pemilu 2014”, KBR68H, 18 February 2014. “Pemprov Papua Curah Rp.10 Miliar APBD 
untuk Pengamanan Pilpres”, Tabloid Jubi, 10 June 2014. Some of this money was officially shared with the local military 
command, to fund security and to strengthen relations between the two institutions.
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Nations and then Indonesian administration until an act of self-determination could be held.8  
The highly contentious Act of Free Choice, a referendum in which 1,026 Papuans handpicked 
by the Indonesian authorities were asked to choose independence or integration with Indonesia, 
was held on 1 May 1969. The vote was unanimous in support of integration, and West Irian be-
came an Indonesian province, soon renamed Irian Jaya. Sporadic resistance to Indonesian rule, 
which had begun in 1965, soon picked up.
The first effort to turn isolated acts of rebellion into a more coherent armed struggle took 
place in 1970, when one group of rebels established a camp at Markas Victoria (Victory Base) in 
Waris, in the foothills of what is now Keerom district. Four would later go on to play important 
roles in the diaspora:
• Seth Rumkorem, the group’s founder. From Biak, he had initially welcomed the Indone-
sian takeover in 1963 and entered the military, graduating from the Bandung Officers’ 
School in 1964 and joining the intelligence service, but he grew disillusioned and became 
sympathetic to the independence cause.9
• Jacob Prai, from the Keerom area along the Papua New Guinea border. He was one of the 
first from this remote area to enter Cenderawasih University in Jayapura, where he studied 
law and founded a Papuan youth movement. 
• John Otto Ondawame, an ethnic Amungme from Mimika, who had come to Jayapura in 
the early 1970s for university and became a protégé of Prai.
• Rex Rumakiek, a young Biak student who had been studying in Java and who returned to 
emerge as the group’s chief political officer.
On 1 July 1971, the members of Markas Victoria issued a proclamation of Papuan indepen-
dence, with Rumkorem as president of a West Papuan provisional government. This remains the 
day many Papuan independence supporters mark as the birth of the OPM.10 
The group remained plagued by leadership struggles and in 1976 it split in two, a division that 
from which it never recovered. Prai in particular had never fully accepted Rumkorem as his com-
mander, viewing him as power-hungry and his Indonesian military background as suspicious. Prai 
and Ondawame left to establish a separate base, known as the Restoration of Justice (Pemulihan 
Keadilan or Pemka) command. The split was partly along ethnic lines, with many Biaks remain-
ing loyal to Rumkorem while the Pemka contingent consisted mostly of those from Keerom and 
further south. Today, some factions continue to invoke the names of Pemka or Markas Victoria to 
indicate where their loyalties lie.
As the military stepped up operations across Papua in the late 1970s and early 80s, many of 
the original members of Markas Victoria fled abroad, looking for political asylum in the Pacific 
or in Europe, and trying, unsuccessfully, to direct OPM actions from a distance. 
The story of the OPM ever since has been one of local commands with limited territorial 
control, operating independently of one another, with periodic and largely unsuccessful efforts 
at unification. The next sections examine how the OPM operates in three areas: Timika, the 
eastern central highlands, and the north coast.
8 The August 1962 New York Agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands stipulated that a United Nations Tempo-
rary Executive Authority would take over administration of the former Dutch colony for seven months. The territory was 
then transferred to Indonesian administration on 1 May 1963 for six years, with a UN-supervised referendum—the so-
called Act of Free Choice—held in 1969.
9 Before Indonesian administration, Rumkorem had worked for eight years as a clerk in the offices of the Dutch airline, KLM. 
His father, like a significant proportion of elite Biaks at the time, was an ardent supporter of integration with Indonesia.
10 The timing of the announcement was motivated in part by their awareness that a rival group based in the Netherlands, led 
by Nicolaas Jouwe, was planning its own independence declaration at the same time. See Robin Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret 
War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya (Sydney, 1987) pp. 55-56.
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IV. OPM IN AND AROUND TIMIKA
The area around the Grasberg gold and copper mine in Mimika district, operated by U.S. compa-
ny Freeport McMoran, has been a lightning rod for attacks by the pro-independence movement 
since the company began operations in 1973.11 Several factors make the mine a focus, including 
its status as a foreign multinational operating on indigenous land, the huge revenues it gener-
ates, and the support it has provided to state security forces. A large contingent of police and 
military here has not eliminated local OPM groups—some argue it has helped sustain them.12
The fact that the OPM has thrived in a situation of rapid economic and population growth 
suggests that the standard government formula of rapid development as a solution to separatism 
needs serious rethinking. The inequities created by Freeport operations; the influx of migrants, 
both from outside Papua and from non-local Papuan ethnic groups; and the availability of new 
sources of revenue have combined to make the Mimika area particularly prone to attack.
A.  Mimika, Kelly Kwalik and the Freeport mine
Mimika is a vast district in western Papua province that spans the area between the southern 
fringe of the highland mountain chain and the coastal plains to the south. The Freeport mine sits 
near its northern border, just west of Indonesia’s highest peak. The upland ranges are home to 
the Amungme people, the swampy lowlands south of the city of Timika home to the Kamoro.13 
A 120-kilometre road connects the mine to the city and a port further south. A slurry pipe runs 
the length of the road to carry ore for export, and the OPM factions maintain camps at different 
positions along the road. 
The start of mining operations in 1973 provided both the trigger and the target for the first 
armed OPM activity in the Mimika area, a May 1977 attack by some 200 OPM fighters on the 
slurry pipe.14 In the military operations that followed, whole settlements were razed. Amungme 
villages in particular were targets of military suspicion for many years, and a large portion of the 
population fled to the lowlands, with a small core of militants heading overland to Papua New 
Guinea.
By the mid-1980s, Kelly Kwalik had made a name for himself as leader of the local OPM unit.15 
In 1986, he was behind the kidnapping and killing of eight Javanese hikers. Ten years later, in 
January 1996 he kidnapped a 26-person team of wildlife researchers, including six foreigners, at 
Mapenduma in what is today Nduga district, making their release conditional on immediate in-
dependence for Papua. On 9 May, after negotiations broke down, Kopassus forces led by Prabowo 
Subianto launched an operation to rescue the eleven hostages still in captivity, which led to the 
deaths of two Indonesians and to reprisals that helped further radicalise the highlands. (They also 
helped ensure Prabowo’s decisive electoral defeat in the province in the 2014 elections.)16
11 Freeport obtained a Contract of Work from the Indonesian government in 1967, before the territory had even been formal-
ly integrated into Indonesia, but production at the mine did not begin until 1973. A preliminary agreement on compensa-
tion for the Amungme, acknowledged as the holders of customary rights to the mine, was reached in 1974 (usually called 
the January Agreement). The mine is operated by PT Freeport Indonesia, a company owned by Freeport McMoran (90.64 
per cent) and the Indonesian government (9.36 per cent).
12 See Eben S. Kirksey and Andreas Harsono, “Murder at Mile 63”, Pantau, 7 November 2006. See also International Crisis 
Group, “Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua”, Asia Report No.188, 11 March 2010.
13 Five other neighbouring clans are also acknowledged to have some customary claim (hak ulayat) to the area around the 
mine: the Mee, Dani, Nduga, Damal and Moni.
14 Muridan S. Widjojo, “Strategi Amungme Untuk Memperoleh Pengakuan di Mimika, Papua”, unpublished Master’s thesis, 
University of Indonesia (Depok, 2002), pp.96-97. 
15 Born in the mid-1950s, Kwalik is said to have spent time in Jayapura in the 1970s and established links to Markas Victoria 
there. While he was active in OPM operations at the time of the 1977 Mimika attacks, he does not appear to have been 
involved in leading them.
16 For more, see IPAC, Open to Manipulation: The 2014 Elections in Papua, Report No. 15, 10 December 2014.
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Kelly’s men were also linked to a 31 August 2002 attack that killed three civilians along the 
Freeport road, including two American schoolteachers, and injured nine others.17 Several sourc-
es pointed to the involvement of military figures in supplying weapons and otherwise facilitating 
the attack, but such involvement would not be inconsistent with an OPM role.18 Many acts of 
violence attributed by the government to the OPM and by Papuan activists to the security forces 
in fact involve both. Corrupt police and military can sell arms and ammunition to the OPM; 
Papuan members of the security forces can include independence sympathisers; and individual 
police and military can encourage OPM hits as a way of increasing protection fees.
It is possible that this murky intersection of security and insurgency was at work in the last 
attacks to involve Kelly Kwalik before his death—a series of shootings that began in July 2009 
along the road linking the mine to the city of Timika including the killing of an Australian en-
gineer named Drew Grant. The provincial police chief at the time said publicly that he believed 
that Kelly’s men were not responsible for the killings, and many Papuan commentators suggest-
ed that the military was using the killings to persuade Freeport to bolster security.19 The elite 
counter-terrorism police unit, Detachment 88, was brought in to pursue the investigation and 
secured clear evidence that the gunmen were OPM, whether or not they were acting on Kelly’s 
orders and whether or not others were involved as well. In December 2009 a Detachment 88 
team tracked Kelly Kwalik to a house in Timika where they shot and killed him, under circum-
stances that remain unclear.20 He was given a hero’s funeral, with eulogies from across Papua. 
B. Kelly Kwalik’s Successors
After Kelly’s death, three different factions emerged, each vying for primacy in the area around 
the mine.21 The first is led by Ayub Waker, who served under Kelly. Ayub developed a base in 
Utekini (also seen as Uini) at Mile 69 on the Freeport road, in an area that was home to thou-
sands of illegal miners—with whom Ayub seems to have a symbiotic relationship. By 2012, he 
was in communication with OPM factions from Paniai and Puncak Jaya about a possible joint 
attack against Freeport. The plans were discovered long before there was any serious prospect 
of follow-through. He also claimed responsibility for the shooting of two Brimob officers and 
a Freeport security officer on 1 January 2015, which prompted a massive security response, in-
volving over 1,500 police and soldiers.22 Police set up 51 security posts in the area, allegedly both 
to prevent the return of Ayub’s men and to expel all illegal miners from the area.23
17 Many Papuans are most commonly known by their first names, particularly those with common clan last names like Wen-
da or Tabuni. References in this report follow common practice.
18 See Eben S. Kirksey and Andreas Harsono, “Murder at Mile 63”, op.cit.; and International Crisis Group, “Radicalisation and 
Dialogue”, op. cit., and International Crisis Group, “Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions”, Asia Briefing No.53, 
5 September 2006. Antonius Wamang admitted to carrying out the shooting; he was sentenced to life imprisonment in 
November 2006. Wamang claimed in his deposition that he believed he was targeting a military convoy.
19 For more on Kwalik’s death, see International Crisis Group, “Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua”, op. cit. Under the 
terms of a 2004 presidential decree (Keputusan Presiden No 63/2004), responsibility for guarding national vital assets (ob-
jek vital) had shifted from the police to the military, a policy change that was made operational around Freeport in 2006.
20 Ibid. Detachment 88 said the shooting was an act of self-defence after Kwalik had raised a gun at them while fleeing arrest.
21 Announcements at the time by sources linked to Ondawame’s WPNCL said that a man called Jack Kemong had taken over 
leadership of the OPM in the Timika area but if he did, it was very short-lived. The WPNCL has often overstated its degree 
of control over and coordination with OPM factions, particularly in online forums. Jack Kemong (sometimes seen as Yeck) 
continues to be quoted as the OPM commander for the Timika region in some blogs linked to WPNCL and others. See, 
for example, “TPNPB-OPM KODAP Kali Kopi, Bertanggungjawab atas Penembakan di Areal PT. Freeport Indonesia”, 23 
December 2013, available at suarakolaitaga.blogspot.com/2013/12/tpnpb-opm-kodap-kali-kopi.html.
22 “KKB Pimpinan Ayub Waker Tantang Polisi”, Cenderawasih Pos, 9 January 2015. On 6 January, police announced they had 
broken up Ayub’s basecamp and burned it down. Two days later, Ayub’s men fired an arrow with a letter attached into a 
police post nearby, saying they would set up a new base elsewhere in Mimika. “KKB Pimpinan Ayub Waker Tantang Polisi”, 
Cenderawasih Pos, 9 January 2015. 
23 Police said they had expelled 12,000 illegal miners during the operation, although by July 2015, it appeared the miners had 
begun to return.
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A second faction is led by Kelly’s nephew, Teny Kwalik. Inexperienced, uneducated, and only 
in his late twenties, he gained influence largely on the back of his family name. His men are 
based near Mile 46 on the Freeport road in the Kali Kopi area, where his uncle was once based.
The third faction, led by Germanus Elobo, was the most active in 2012-2013. Of 27 shootings 
along the Freeport road during the period, twenty were reportedly by Germanus’ men. Once 
a follower of Ayub Waker, he struck out on his own and is known to dislike Teny, whose men 
receive credit for most of the violence in the area because of the Kwalik name, even though they 
carry out few attacks. The Germanus group is highly mobile, moving between the Kali Kopi base 
and Ayub Waker’s territory, closer to the mine.
While police have known the locations of the three factions since 2009, they were reluctant, 
until the January 2015 shooting, to take any armed action against them. The public explanation 
was that they feared causing civilian casualties, because women and children live alongside the 
OPM fighters. The Yudhoyono government reportedly banned any police operations here on 
these grounds, fearing the international outcry that would result if Papuans were killed.24 No 
such restriction seems to have been imposed by the Jokowi government. 
C. “Development” and the OPM
Mimika provides an object lesson in how development can fuel pro-independence sentiment 
rather than eliminate it. The district was home to explosive growth in the 1990s, as migrants 
from across Papua and Indonesia were drawn to the area and its population tripled.25 Employ-
ment at Freeport increased as production shifted at the end of the 1980s from the Ertsberg mine 
to the Grasberg mine, home to larger reserves; and economic activity in the city of Timika grew. 
Mimika was made a separate kabupaten in 1996, carved out of Fak-Fak, over 300 miles to the 
west, and government offices were built for the first time. In response to large-scale protests in 
1995-1996, Freeport began making payments equal to 1 per cent of its revenues to local commu-
nities, providing a further stimulus to local economic activity. And as OPM activity increased in 
the 1990s, and rioting in and around Timika in 1994 and 1996 targeted the Freeport company, 
so too did the presence of state security forces, from just 100 police and soldiers in the 1970s to 
1,800 in the mid-1990s.26
At the same time, another factor came into play: the money to be earned from illegal gold 
panning. The start of operations at Grasberg brought a major increase in the production of run-
off waste (tailings) and people from other tribes in the highlands, especially Damal and Dani, 
realised there were riches to be gleaned from panning, and they poured into the area, as did en-
trepreneurs from Sulawesi and Java. Police and army controlled access to the site and marketing 
of the gold, earning a share of the proceeds. Gold prices soared in the mid-2000s, increasing the 
influx and the tensions. Occasional and half-hearted efforts to remove panners from the area 
inside the Freeport concession became new opportunities for student groups and others to mo-
bilise anti-Freeport sentiment.27
Far from dampening pro-independence sentiment, the rapid social and economic change 
24 See Sidney Jones, “Yudhoyono’s legacy on internal security: achievements and missed opportunities” in Edward Aspinall, 
Marcus Mietzner and Dirk Tomsa (eds.), The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation (Singa-
pore 2015).
25 According to census figures, the population of Mimika district grew from 32,935 in 1990 to 101,036 in 2000. See Badan Pu-
sat Statisik Provinsi Papua, “Proyeksi jumlah penduduk Provinsi Papua menurut kabupaten/kota tahun 1971, 1980, 1990, 
2000, 2005-2010, 2012-2014”, available at papua.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/35.
26 See Chris Ballard and Glenn Banks, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Corporate Strategy at the Freeport Mine in Papua, 
2001-2006”, in Budy Resosudarmo and Frank Jotzo (Eds.), Working with Nature against Poverty: Development, Resources 
and the Environment in Eastern Indonesia (Singapore, 2009), p. 167. 
27 See International Crisis Group, “Radicalisation and Dialogue”, Section 2, op. cit.
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only increased it, suggesting government efforts to accelerate development in Papua are not on 
their own an effective antidote to insurgency.28 
V. THE OPM IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS 
Following Kelly Kwalik’s death, the centre of OPM armed activity shifted northwards to the area 
around Puncak Jaya, where one of Kelly’s former fighters, Goliat Tabuni, had moved a decade 
earlier. Since arriving in 2004, Goliat and his followers have made Puncak Jaya the most violent 
district in Papua. That record has helped Goliat extend his sway over operations beyond Puncak 
Jaya to the neighbouring districts of Puncak and Tolikara, as well as further west in Paniai. It has 
also made him the target of competition from a challenger in neighbouring Lanny Jaya district, 
Puron Wenda.
The central highlands have seen a more rapid expansion in the number of districts (kabu-
paten) since 2000 than any other part of Papua. One reason is the strength of the armed OPM 
here—proponents of new districts argue they offer an opportunity to counter the appeal of sep-
aratism, by bringing government “closer to the people” and improving services. But in fact, new 
local executives are often weighed down by clan obligations, unskilled and often absentee bu-
reaucracies and their own inexperience, and receive little or no supervision from Jakarta. They 
often have a parasitic relationship with the OPM: the creation of new districts has made more 
money available for buying off local commanders, while continued low-level violence provides 
a justification for increased budgets, as districts must account for increased security costs.  
A. Goliat Tabuni and Puncak Jaya politics 
Originally from Gurage in Puncak Jaya, Goliat is said to have joined the OPM in the 1980s after 
being beaten up by soldiers over a wrongful rape accusation.29 In the 1990s, drawn to the area 
by the legend of Kelly Kwalik, he settled in Kali Kopi near the Freeport mine, before returning 
to Puncak Jaya in 2004. 
Goliat has actively intervened in local elections without being able to determine the results.30 
Shortly after his return, he and his followers began to clash with police and military in Tingginam-
but subdistrict. Unrest continued in advance of the district’s first local election, originally sched-
uled for 2006. The incumbent bupati, appointed by the central government, was a Kei islander 
named Elieser Renmaur from neighbouring Maluku province. Lukas Enembe, from nearby To-
likara, was his deputy, and both announced their intention to run. To shore up support for his can-
didacy despite his non-Papuan status, Elieser reached out to Goliat and his followers for support, 
presumably believing that the OPM leader, as a respected Dani elder, could help deliver a victory.31 
28 A major source of deaths in the Mimika area has nothing to do with the separatist struggle—the recurrent fighting between 
Dani and Moni settlers in the areas around Kwamki Lama. They first moved in after the original Amungme occupants fled 
military operations in 1977.
29 See International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Hope and Hard Reality in Papua”, Asia Briefing No.126, 22 August 2011.
30 Richard Chauvel has written about the division between two “distinct realms of politics” in Papua, in which Papuan na-
tionalist politics is sealed off from electoral politics. See “Electoral Politics and Democratic Freedoms in Papua”, in Edward 
Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (Eds.), Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society (Singa-
pore, 2010). 
31 See Richard Chauvel, “Refuge, displacement and dispossession: responses to Indonesian rule and conflict in Papua”, Oxford 
University Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper 42, September 2007. Whether or not non-Papuans can run for local 
office remains a recurrent tension in local politics in Papua. Law 21/2001 only placed restrictions on the post of governor 
and deputy governor, who must be indigenous Papuans, but there have been efforts by bodies such as the Papuan People’s 
Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua) to extend the restriction to all local government posts, including in a resolution on 16 June 
2015 that the elections commission said it would ignore. See “KPU Tolak Resolusi MRP Soal Bupati Harus Orang Asli 
Papua”, Kompas.com, 30 June 2015. In practice, many non-Papuans will only run for the office of deputy bupati, alongside 
an indigenous bupati candidate.
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But Enembe—who would later be elected governor of Papua in January 2013—nevertheless man-
aged to secure nearly 75 per cent of the vote. 
In 2009, Tabuni lent his support to the Golkar party on the condition that his cousin, Deerd 
Tabuni, would be elected to the provincial parliament. One Papuan political leader told of vis-
iting Tingginambut with Deerd during campaigning for the 2009 parliamentary elections and 
being led to an empty field. After Deerd whistled a few times, Goliat emerged from the woods 
along with hundreds of fighters and followers.32 Deerd was elected, but Enembe, who by now 
was provincial chair of President Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party, ensured that over 80 per cent of 
the votes in the district still went to his party.33 One factor in Enembe’s success may have been 
his decision to declare an emergency in Tingginambut just before the election and evacuate the 
population.34 Enembe and Goliat have reportedly had poor relations ever since.
If Goliat has failed to control access to local political office, he has nevertheless cemented 
his role as the most influential OPM commander since Kelly Kwalik’s death. His rise is in part a 
reflection of his ability to conduct high-profile ambushes of police and military—at least 29 have 
been killed in Puncak Jaya and neighbouring Puncak since 2009.35 But another factor has been 
the increased role of highlanders, and particularly ethnic Dani and Lani—in the pro-indepen-
dence movement as a whole, a change that has been brought about in part by the success of the 
West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB), a pro-independence 
activist group, in mobilising grassroots support.36 In May 2012, two of Goliat’s long-time associ-
ates, Dinus “Rambo” Wakerkwa and Anton Tabuni, worked with KNPB to organise a congress 
in Biak that brought Goliat’s supporters together with some OPM factions in Biak and along the 
north coast. Although he did not attend, Goliat was appointed supreme commander (panglima 
tertinggi) of the OPM, and a ceremony was held in Tingginambut in December 2012 to mark 
his new rank. 
Goliat’s prominence has made him the most sought-after figure of government persuasion 
efforts—if local government positions are not available for direct capture, he nevertheless enjoys 
benefits from the state.37 Throughout the Yudhoyono government, police, intelligence and the 
military made various attempts to reach out to him, on the theory that if he could be persuaded 
to lay down his arms and embrace the Indonesian state, others would follow. Behind the per-
suasion usually lay money and offers of perks, which had worked in the past with some OPM 
leaders and had brought several founding figures like Nicolaas Jouwe back to Papua. Local offi-
cials, including the local police chief, preferred to work out a mutual accommodation strategy, 
in which whatever payments were made were far less than the cost of undertaking counter-in-
surgency operations deep into the mountains where Goliat and his men would always have the 
advantage. 
Officials in the Jokowi government also seem to have made Goliat the main object of persua-
32  IPAC interview, Jakarta, 31 March 2015.
33 Golkar continued to hold the most seats in the provincial legislature, and John Ibo, a Golkar member from Sentani, Jayapu-
ra was elected chairman. When he was removed from the position during a corruption trial in 2013, Deerd took over the 
position. In 2014, Deerd was re-elected to the provincial assembly but from the neighbouring legislative district of Lanny 
Jaya and Jayawijaya. Deerd continues to serve as a kind of spokesperson for Goliat—in March 2015, he was one of the first 
to announce that reports of a surrender were false. “Goliat Tabuni: 23 Orang yang Menyerahkan Diri Bukan OPM”, VivaNews, 
27 March 2015.
34  “Sering Diteror GPK, 33,000 Warga Tingginambut Diungsikan”, Sinar Harapan, 3 March 2009.
35 Tabulated from data in the National Violence Monitoring System, which is based on local media reporting. See www.
nvms-indonesia.com.
36 For more on the KNPB see Section VII.B.
37 Elsewhere in the highlands, local officials have offered jobs to ex-OPM fighters as a kind of reintegration effort, only to see 
them return to fighting when those jobs are taken away. According to former regional police chief Karnavian, this was one 
factor a June 2013 arson attack on the police headquarters in Pegunungan Bintang. The leaders of the attack were ex-OPM 
who had for a time benefitted from civil service positions but grew angry when district government assistance dried up and 
looked for other sources of income. See Karnavian, Guardian over the Land of the Cenderawasih, op. cit., chapter 3.
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sion efforts. In late March 2015, the provincial military chief announced that Goliat had agreed 
to surrender in exchange for government-provided housing.38 Within 48 hours, there was a 
correction: only twelve men with no fighting role had accepted offers to join the local municipal 
security force.39 The government does not have much to offer Goliat in the way of true incen-
tives—he suffers little in the way of harassment from security forces (he is in regular touch with 
the local police commander) and he has shown little inclination over the past decade to expand 
territorial control beyond Tingginambut.  
B. Puncak district 
When Puncak was carved out of Puncak Jaya in 2008, it was in the hopes that a new kabupaten 
would provide greater security, a higher standard of living and a greater “feeling of Indonesian-
ness” for its residents that would stem the appeal of separatism.40 But the reverse may be true: 
the new district has become a theatre for new security battles and the advent of local political 
competitions has been both bloody and expensive.
Two key factions here are led by Goliat’s subordinates: Militer Murib and Lekaka Telenggen. 
Murib played a key role in the lead-up to Puncak’s first direct election, which was originally 
planned for 2011. Two leading candidates were from rival clans: Elvis Tabuni was an ethnic Dani 
while Simon Alom was Damal. Fighting between the two camps broke out when both candi-
dates tried to register as the Gerindra party candidate; at least 23 were killed in the first week of 
fighting.41 Elvis Tabuni reportedly reached out to Goliat Tabuni, who called in the help of Militer 
Murib’s men.42 By early 2013, at least 30 had been killed in election-related violence, and the 
kabupaten government had paid out Rp.17 billion (roughly $1.5 million) to victims’ families, 
making it one of the most expensive local elections in Indonesia.
The violence continued after the election was finally held in February 2013. Militer Murib’s 
men, acting on Goliat’s command, shot and killed seven soldiers in Sinak, Puncak district on 21 
February 2013 in what appears to have been an attempt to create security conditions that would 
force a delay in the announcement of the winner.43 
Lekaka Telenggen, less prominent, heads a small OPM unit in Kampung Yambi in Mulia sub-
district, along with another man identified as Tenga Mati Telenggen. Lekaka’s men have played 
an active role in recent years in reaching out to other highland commanders.
C. Lanny Jaya and Puron Wenda
The creation of another kabupaten, Lanny Jaya, in 2008 along Puncak Jaya’s eastern border, 
helped create the space for a competing faction to emerge, led by Goliat’s most serious challenger 
to date, Puron Wenda. Puron (also seen as Purom) was originally based in Puncak Jaya, where he 
operated under the command of both Goliat and another commander, Marunggen Wonda. But 
some time around 2010, as Marunggen grew increasingly drawn into supporting the bid of bupati 
Lukas Enembe for governor and less interested in launching attacks, Puron broke out on his own 
38 See, for example, “Goliat Tabuni, Jenderal OPM Menyerahkan Diri ke TNI”, VivaNews, 24 March 2015.
39 “Goliat Tabuni: 23 Orang yang Menyerahkan Diri Bukan OPM”, VivaNews, 27 March 2015.
40 Cornelis Lay and Purwo Santoso (Eds.), Perjuangan Menuju Puncak, op.cit.
41 Candidates for local elections require the support of parties holding a total of fifteen per cent of seats in the local legislature 
(or the signatures of between 6.5 and 10 per cent of registered voters in a given district for independents). Many of these 
party recommendations are effectively sold to candidates willing to pay the most money. In Papua, a recurrent source of 
electoral violence is dual recommendations by a single party—this happens either when the party decides to issue a recom-
mendation but then later accepts a higher bid and issues a new one, or when vying factions of the party produce conflicting 
recommendations. None has proved so deadly as the dispute in Puncak. 
42 See IPAC, Carving Up Papua: More Districts, More Problems, IPAC Report No. 3, 9 October 2013.
43 An eighth soldier was killed in a separate attack the next day in Tingginambut. See IPAC, Carving Up Papua, op.cit.
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to challenge Goliat’s leadership. He allied himself with Enden Wanimbo, a former middle school 
teacher who had played a key role in advocating the creation of Lanny Jaya but joined the OPM 
after he was passed over for an expected promotion to head the district’s education department.44
One of Puron’s first actions was an attack on the Pirime district police station in November 
2012, when his men shot dead three officers and burned down the station with their bodies in-
side.45 The attack appeared to be a show of strength, a way of making a name for the new faction. 
It also came just days before a planned OPM ceremony near Tingginambut organised to formal-
ly install Goliat as Supreme Commander, in accordance with the results of the meeting in Biak 
six months earlier; Goliat’s supporters claimed the attack was planned to block the ceremony 
from going ahead.46
Despite the violence, the district government kept providing funds to Puron. In August 2014, 
Lanny Jaya bupati Befa Jigibalom admitted to reporters he routinely gave his group amounts 
“between Rp.5 million [$400] and Rp.25 million [$2,000]” and that he had also given them 
Rp.100 million [roughly $8,000] to travel to Vanimo in PNG to attend meetings.47 One local 
anti-OPM group, the Komite Pemuda Pancasila Anti-Korupsi Papua (Kompak), claims that the 
sums given to Puron from the district budget were in fact far higher—as much as Rp. 17 bil-
lion—the bupati denies this.48
Puron’s group was responsible for four separate shooting incidents between the end of May 
and early August 2014 in subdistricts Makki, Pirime and Tiom that resulted in five police killed 
and eleven injured, as well as the death of one motorcycle taxi (ojek) driver.49 The group also 
reportedly twice traded fire with soldiers in the same period and lost six men. The police deaths 
led the provincial police commander in August 2014 to announce stepped-up efforts to arrest 
Puron, Enden and their followers, but as of July 2015, the two principals remained at large.50
Competition between different OPM factions remains one driver of violence in the central 
highlands. Although there is no agreed formal rank structure across the different factions, in-
dividual commanders can rise to greater influence by besting one another through more im-
pressive attacks. This phenomenon may be more pronounced in the highlands than elsewhere 
in part because traditional structures of leadership and authority among the Dani are more 
dynamic than elsewhere: leadership positions are not inherited but acquired in a system where 
battles between different groups, connected through fluid alliances, has long been a way of life.51 
D. Paniai and Nabire
OPM factions have not systematically imposed “war taxes” typically demanded by other guerril-
la groups, but in some areas they have sought funds in exchange for providing security in remote 
44 Enden has refuted the idea that he was drawn to the OPM because of career disappointment in statements to the press. See, 
for example, “Enden Wanimbo: Kami Tak Akan Berhenti Berjuang”, Tabloid Jubi online, 8 August 2014.
45 Two of the officers slain were Papuans from Biak. The incident is described by then-provincial police commander (Kapol-
da) Tito Karnavian in Guardian over the Land of Cenderawasih (Jakarta, 2014), pp.1-7.
46 The ceremony took place two weeks later on 11 December 2012. Video of the swearing-in, conducted in front of some 150 
followers, is available on the YouTube account named “Sekretariat Pusat TPNOPM” at www.youtube.com/watch?4GxM-
8Vt4Q7s. The account appears to be affiliated with a website that calls itself the national committee of the TPN Papua Barat, 
www.komnas-tpnpb.net, which appears to be linked to the WPNCL.
47 “Kerap Diancam OPM, Bupati Lanny Jaya Akui Pernah Beri Uang”, Liputan6.com, 2 August 2014.
48 “Konpak Klaim APBD Ikut Dinikmati OPM”, Bintang Papua, 16 June 2015.
49 The violence reportedly led to large number of civilians temporarily fleeing the area. From one shooting in July 2014, 
members of the group stole four weapons: a Mauser, a revolver and two Pindan assault rifles (SS1-V2 Sabara, and V5). 
“Masyarakat Tiga Distrik di Lanny Jaya Ngungsi: Dua Polisi Tewas, Empat Senpi Dirampas KKB”, Cenderawasih Pos, 29 
July 2014.
50 “Tiga Anggota OPM Dibekuk Polisi, Tujuh Orang Lagi Masuk DPO”, Suluh Papua, 27 January 2015.
51 One detailed account of the Dani, focused on Baliem Valley area around Wamena to the east of Puncak Jaya, is found in 
Karl Heider’s Grand Valley Dani: Peaceful Warriors (Belmont, 1997).
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locations. Paniai and Nabire in the western highlands, site of limited armed uprisings by OPM 
groups in the 1970s and 80s and now home to an array of legal and illegal mining activities, 
are cases in point.52 Again, a surge in economic activity here has not weakened the main OPM 
faction, which—at least until earlier this year—had survived several leadership transitions. The 
western highlands around Paniai and Nabire are home predominantly to the Mee and Moni 
peoples, culturally distinct from the Dani.
The leading OPM faction here was first established by Thadeus Yogi, an ethnic Mee, in Eduda, 
near the district capital, Enarotali, in the late 1970s and command has stayed in the family ever 
since. Thadeus first became active in the wave of violence across the highlands that preceded the 
1977 election, when his group killed four Papuans campaigning for office.53 His reputation grew 
in the mid-1990s when his men kidnapped seventeen logging employees from neighbouring 
Mimika district. His brother, Titus Orop, was killed in a skirmish with the military following the 
kidnapping but Thadeus somehow escaped capture. 
In the 2000s, rumours began to surface that the group was collaborating with security forces 
and the local government. In 2009, a leaked military intelligence document suggested it was re-
ceiving fuel and basic goods (sembako) from the provincial government and that it had received 
Rp.8 billion (roughly $800,000 at prevailing exchange rates) from the district government as 
compensation for use of customary land (hak ulayat).54 While OPM fighters in the highlands 
live in camps hidden in the forests, Thadeus was said to live down the street from the local police 
commander. By 2010, Thadeus had fallen fatally ill and his two sons, Salmon and John Yogi took 
over command of the group, known as Pemka Kodap IV Eduda. It was increasingly involved 
in extortion from the booming illegal mining business but proclamations of its independence 
credentials were available on YouTube for anyone who wanted to look. 55 In late 2011, it was the 
target of a large police operation which likely killed Salmon.56 By 2012, members of the group 
were discussing the possibility of joint operations around Freeport with Lekaka Telenggen from 
Puncak, but the planning never got very far. Police in early 2015 were still referring to the group 
as the “John Yogi group”, but John died in 2013 and at some point another relation, Leo Magai 
Yogi, took over command. 
On 30 April 2015, Leo was killed by security forces at a roadside checkpoint in Nabire, even 
as intelligence authorities were reportedly reaching out to him with the same package being 
offered Goliat—housing, jobs, money. Both the substance and style of the offer were reportedly 
offensive, and Leo rejected the offer. As with Kelly Kwalik’s death, the circumstances of Leo’s are 
murky but however it happened, his death will heighten distrust and anger on the part of pro-in-
dependence forces and ensure that further offers are treated with suspicion.
E. Arms Sales 
Across the highlands, OPM access to cash from pay-offs and protection fees seems to be open-
ing up more opportunities for the movement to purchase weapons and ammunition. The ques-
tion is what impact this will have on the OPM’s low fighting capacity.
OPM members in the highlands have purchased weapons from gun dealers from Ambon, 
52 See International Crisis Group, “Dynamics of Violence in Papua”, op. cit. Armed resistance in Paniai began as early as Feb-
ruary 1969, triggered in part by anger in the hill town of Enarotali that the district capital had been moved to the port of 
Nabire, roughly seventy miles west. In March 1969, they shot at an aircraft carrying then provincial military commander 
Sarwo Edhi Wibowo, injuring the leg of the local police chief who was onboard. See Djopari, op.cit., p. 113.
53 Eben S. Kirksey, Freedom in Entangled Worlds: West Papua and the Architecture of Global Power, (Durham, 2012).
54 Satuan Tugas Bantuan 7 Satuan Taktis 1, “Laporan Informasi Nomor R/216/LI/VI/2009”, October 2009. 
55 For example, see the interview with Salmon Yogi uploaded to Youtube on 11 October 2011 and available at www.youtube.
com/watch?v=QWL9H1lJVPw; and a video of a 1 December flag-raising ceremony posted by “Sekretariat Pusat TPNOPM” 
on 31 December 2013 at www.youtube.com/watch?v=-SAHxdmJJKY.
56 See International Crisis Group, “Dynamics of Violence”, op. cit. 
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Papua New Guinea and indirectly from the Philippines, via the Sangihe islands off the coast of 
north Sulawesi, an important source of migrant workers in Papua.57 In the past, the OPM has 
relied as much on bows and arrows as firearms and the guns it had were obtained through raids 
on police and army posts or through purchase from corrupt officers. One of the most successful 
of these raids was the 2003 attack on a post in Wamena by the five men who in May 2015 were 
granted clemency by President Jokowi.58
Using new sources of funds to purchase from gun mafias could increase the quantity and 
quality of weapons at the OPM’s disposal, although the only sign of increased military capacity 
has been the occasional sniper-like shooting along the Freeport road. 
Ammunition, like many of the guns, continues to come almost exclusively from corrupt sol-
diers and police. In 2014, both services began to take action against such sales. In October 2014, 
police arrested one of their own and a group of five alleged OPM members in Wamena as part 
of a sting operation targeting police-run ammunition sales. Among the five was at least one man 
linked to Puron’s group—Rambo Wenda (also seen as Wonda) alias Enggangranggo Wenereng-
ga—as well as others active in the neighbouring district of Tolikara. In late February 2015, the 
case was handed over to prosecutors for trial.59 In a separate case, in January 2015, five military 
officers were arrested on charges of providing ammunition to OPM fighters. In June 2015, a 
military court sentenced them to between ten and twelve years in prison.60
VI. THE OPM ON THE NORTHERN COAST
The OPM factions along the north coast are far less active than their highland counterparts, and 
the line between armed and unarmed pro-independence activism here is more blurred. The area 
around Jayapura city and the districts (kabupaten) of Jayapura and Keerom, stretching eastwards 
to the border with Papua New Guinea, see the most deadly violence outside the highlands. To 
the west, including Serui, Biak and Sorong, OPM units are less active; some claim hundreds of 
sympathisers and possess rudimentary weapons but almost never engage in violence beyond 
occasional flag-waving or extortion rackets. However, local security forces still stage raids or sur-
renders, making the situation seem more serious than it is, perhaps to secure greater funding 
from Jakarta. 
A. Competing Commands: Mathias Wenda and Richard Hans Yoweni
It was on the north coast that the original Markas Victoria was established and there are echoes 
of its 1976 split in the rivalry between Mathias Wenda and Richard Hans Yoweni.  Neither is 
believed to play an active role in commanding attacks (although Yoweni is still often cited as a 
leading commander); both are reported to be in failing health. The failure of any strong successor 
to emerge is a further reflection of how the influence of OPM units in the coastal areas has faded.
Wenda is originally from Piramid in what is now Lanny Jaya. By the mid-1970s he had joined 
the Pemka faction and became one highlander who played an important role in building a link 
between the coastal factions and the highlands, beginning with a wave of attacks in 1977. He is 
57 Police say three men arrested on 19 May 2014 were carrying three guns and the equivalent of roughly $8,000 (Rp. 87.6 
million) in cash. “Polisi Ungkap Penyelendupan Senjata dari Filipina”, Cenderawasih Pos, 20 May 2015. In an interesting 
parallel, Jemaah Islamiyah and some other extremist groups used a route through the Sangihe islands to get to Mindanao 
for training and weapons purchases in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
58 The five were freed in May 2015 by presidential decree. They had been serving sentences to terms of between 19 years and 
life imprisonment for their role in raiding the Wamena district military command (Kodim) arsenal in April 2003 and seiz-
ing weapons. Two soldiers were killed during the raid.
59 “Berkas Kasus 5 KKB dan 1 Mantan Polisi Lengkap”, Suluh Papua, 25 February 2015.
60 “Jual Amunisi ke OPM, 5 Anggota TNI AD Dipecat dan Divonis Penjara”, detikNews, 18 June 2015.
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said to have fled to Papua New Guinea during the military operations that followed.61 Yoweni is an 
ethnic Serui who was once based between Sarmi and western Jayapura and established his greatest 
influence on the north coast.62
Wenda’s appointment as supreme commander in 2006 had created unhappiness among 
coastal OPM members who remained loyal to Yoweni and who were not prepared to acknowl-
edge Wenda as their leader. They saw his flight to Papua New Guinea as a mark against him, and 
viewed Yoweni as the more capable commander. In 2008, perhaps in response to these concerns, 
Ondawame and other members of the WPNCL appointed Yoweni as their chairperson and as 
chief commander of the OPM as well. 
Wenda’s influence fell as a result. In recent years he has rarely been involved in violence, al-
though in 2014, police named him as a suspect in a series of shooting attacks on markets and bor-
der posts in the area around Skouw in which one person died.63 Some pro-independence websites 
still carry statements in his name, usually disparaging the efforts of the WPNCL or others.64 But 
Yoweni has also remained largely quiet.65
B. Violence around Jayapura 
The area around Jayapura, capital of Papua province with over 350,000 people, is home to the 
deadliest separatist violence outside the central highlands, but it is far less clear who is responsi-
ble. Little violence here appears to be reliably attributable to the OPM, although there are some 
factions active in the area. Some deaths have instead been linked to the activist group KNPB, 
either a result of direct violence by KNPB members or arising during demonstrations by the 
group that have turned deadly. 
In 2010 and 2011, police alleged that Danny Kogoya, whom they called the Jayapura OPM 
commander, and the Jayapura TPN-OPM faction was responsible for two murders of migrants 
in Kampung Nafri, a village that sits on the only road between Jayapura and Keerom.66 
Kogoya was only formally made a suspect in the Nafri killings in 2012, following a separate 
outbreak of violence in Jayapura, which saw a string of eight killings of non-Papuans from May 
to July 2012. Police claimed several of these murders (others were never formally solved) were 
carried out by members of the KNPB and that they came after a shift towards a more violent 
strategy by KNPB leader Mako Tabuni (see below).67 The link, if any, between Kogoya and these 
murders was not made clear, but on 2 September 2012, he was arrested along with 22 followers 
in relation to the Nafri murders.68 Police shot him in the leg during the arrest. In testimony pro-
vided to the police, he said he had been invited to join the OPM in 2009 by Lambertus Pekikir, 
who claimed to be “TPN-OPM Coordinator” and who made him spokesperson.69 This would 
be surprising if true—while most of the OPM factions are relatively ethnically homogenous, all 
61 He was arrested there in 2001 and held for one month in a Vanimo prison, but Indonesia’s request for extradition was never 
granted.
62 Testimony in case dossier of Isak Demotouw (alias Alex Makabory) et al. 2 April 2013, Nomor BP/01/IV/2013/RESKRIM.
63 “Mathias Wenda Diduga Dalangi Aksi Penembakan Papua”, Republika Online, 18 April 2014.
64 The most active such site is papuapos.com
65 In March 2013, the Indonesian district military command in Sarmi arrested four of Yoweni’s men, saying they were wanted 
in connection with an attack in Betaf, Sarmi that had killed four Kopassus members in 2001. Ultimately they were charged 
instead with rebellion and possession of explosives. See “Terkait Penangkapan 4 Anggota OPM di Sarmi”, Cenderawasih 
Pos, 6 March 2015. See also Case Dossier of Isak Demotouw (alias Alex Makabory) et al., op.cit.
66 On 28 November 2010, a non-Papuan man was riding his motorbike with his family and was shot in the chest and died; 
four others, including his wife, were injured. On 1 August 2011, four non-Papuans, including one soldier, were killed in 
a daylight attack in the village. “Pimpinan OPM Wilayah Jayapura Segera Disidangkan”, Kompasiana.com, 16 November 
2012
67 Pengadilan Tinggi Jayapura, Decision Number 07/PID/2013/PT.JPR, 21 March 2013.
68 “Polisi Tangkap 22 Anggota OPM Jayapura”, VivaNews, 3 September 2012.
69 Testimony of Pendius Kogoya alias Danny Kogoya, 5 November 2012, provided to Jayapura police.
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of the men operating with Kogoya were ethnic Dani and Lani from the highlands; none of the 
other OPM figures named in the testimony are known to have links to highland factions.
Kogoya was sentenced to twelve years in prison but the judge never ordered his imprison-
ment and he fled to Papua New Guinea. He died there in December 2013 under mysterious 
circumstances; one version was that he died of an infection in the leg wound. There have been 
no murders in Jayapura city linked to separatist violence since.
South of Jayapura, in Keerom district, a government policy to clear large parts of the north-
ern part of the district for palm oil plantations in the 1980s and 1990s, worked largely by trans-
migrants, was motivated in part by security concerns: clearing the land of sago groves made it 
easier to secure.70 While the area provided safe haven for the Pemka faction in the late 1970s, 
most of the OPM presence here seems to have been driven over the border into Papua New 
Guinea or southwards into the highlands.
The remaining OPM presence does not have a fixed base. Lambertus Pekikir’s faction moves 
between Keerom and camps in Papua New Guinea. It has also been far less active in recent 
years—while Pekikir may have told Danny Kogoya he was coordinator for all of Papua, he is 
frequently in the news more because of his fondness for media attention than for any insurgent 
activity.71 Pekikir, long a staunch opponent of any negotiated solution with the central govern-
ment, changed his stance in 2014 and began publicly calling for dialogue. The shift in tone 
deepened suspicions among many in Papua that he is playing both sides, using connections to 
the military.72
C. Serui, Sorong and Biak
Although the armed factions further east on the islands of Biak and Serui and in Sorong have 
very rarely launched attacks, they remain important for their capacity to mobilise pro-indepen-
dence sentiment.
The OPM in Biak owes its influence more to historical legacy and ability to serve as a link 
between alumni of the armed factions in the diaspora and active groups inside Papua. It played 
a key role in May 2012, when Kabor Awom’s Perwomi command centre in West Biak played host 
to the OPM meeting in May 2012 at which Goliat Tabuni was appointed Supreme Commander, 
in a direct challenge to Yoweni and Wenda. A video posted on Youtube claiming to have been 
shot during the meeting shows a military-style roll-call before a raised Morning Star flag flanked 
by two United Nations flags and a crowd of roughly eighty people in combat fatigues and twenty 
in dress whites.73 There is also footage of what appear to be the results of a leadership election, 
which Goliat won with 87 out of 140 votes.74 It is not clear from the video or from other sources 
exactly who attended the meeting, or the relative representation of active armed fighters and 
others with more distant links to the OPM. But it was the Biak faction of the OPM, working in 
collaboration with Goliat’s associates from the KNPB that made the meeting happen. There is 
little evidence, however, that collaboration between KNPB and Goliat continued after the meet-
ing. 
70  See awasMIFEE, “Papua Oil Palm Atlas”, March 2015, available at awasmifee.potager.org.
71  Police accused his group of an attack in 2006 in Wembi, Arso that killed two police and the fatal shooting of a village head 
on 1 July 2012. See “OPM Disinyalir Dalang Penyerangan Pos TNI Wembi”, Liputan6.com, 11 April 2006; “Kasus Bintang 
Kejora”, Komisi Kepolisian Indonesia, 29 July 2009; and “OPM Bantah Tembak Kepala Desa di Keerom”, Tempo, 2 July 
2015.
72  “OPM Bantah Tembak Kepala Desa di Keerom”, Tempo, 2 July 2015.
73  See www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTE3D7vpsYM.
74 The other votes listed are for Gabriel Melkisedek Awom (21), Jhon Magai Yogi (17), Terianus Satto (9) and Dani Tani 
Tabuni (6). Awom is Biak and likely another member of the Kabor Awom faction; Jhon Yogi’s inclusion suggests that at least 
some of his supporters from the Paniai faction were in attendance.
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In Serui (also known as Yapen), an island in the Cenderawasih Bay just south of Biak, a small 
number of OPM fighters have shown how difficult it can be to uproot even a poorly armed 
faction. Security forces launched deadly raids on two linked groups of fighters in 2014, both of 
which appear to have been involved in extortion rackets and in periodic shootouts with police.75 
In July 2014, police shot dead Rudi Oreri, the man who claimed to be the OPM commander 
for Yapen and Mamberamo, who may have controlled roughly 30 men.76 Police believe Mikael 
Marany has replaced Oreri as commander. 
Papua Barat province, despite being home to the first OPM armed action in July 1965—has 
seen very little separatist violence since Soeharto fell. The last major incident took place in Wasi-
or, in what is now Teluk Wondama district, south of Manokwari, in 2001.77 If violence is rare, the 
vestiges of an OPM structure remain in some areas. On 30 April 2013, police in Aimas, south of 
Sorong city, arrested a man named Isak Kalaibin, who they said was the TPN/OPM commander 
for the area and was planning a ceremony to raise the Morning Star flag the next day. Violence 
erupted, and three people were killed, even though police say they fired only warning shots.78 
Several of the victims and others later at the meeting were found to be carrying OPM member-
ship cards. In December 2013, Isak was sentenced to three and a half years on rebellion charges. 
There has been no other violence in the area.
The resilience of these groups along the coast shows that even factions that are militarily 
weak or irrelevant to the armed struggle continue to play a significant role in the broader inde-
pendence movement. Cells like those in Biak, Sorong and Sarmi are likely to continue to provide 
a vehicle for organising anti-Jakarta sentiment even if they lack access to arms. 
VII. BEYOND THE ARMED OPM: THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL FRONTS
While the armed factions constitute an important symbolic core for the independence move-
ment, a vast web of political pressure groups, both inside and outside Papua, make up a far larger 
and far more active presence. Relations between these groups have often been characterised by 
the same enmity and disarray as those of the armed factions, but two factors came together in 
2014 to generate a new—if tenuous—strategic unity that is changing dynamics both at home 
and abroad. Advances in communications technologies and the popularity of social media have 
made it easier for figures in the diaspora to play a coordinating role from abroad, while the de-
sire to join the Melanesian Spearhead Group provided a practical short-term goal. 
The pro-independence groups that came together in December 2014 in Vanuatu to forge the 
United Liberation Movement for West Papua with this goal in mind had particularly rocky rela-
tions in the past. The West Papua National Authority (WPNA), the West Papua National Coali-
tion for Liberation (WPNCL) and the Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB) are each comprised 
75 In February 2014, a joint police-military team went to Sasawa in western Yapen, where an OPM meeting was said to be tak-
ing place. In the clash that followed, one OPM fighter was killed and two police, one soldier and one civilian were slightly 
injured. Seven men were arrested and charged with rebellion and weapons possession; they were sentenced to three and a 
half years in prison. “Kontak Senjata di Yapen, Seorang Tewas”, Tabloid Jubi online, 2 February 2014.
76 “Tim Gabungan Tembak Mati Pimpinan KKB di Yapen”, Cenderawasih Pos, 11 June 2014. 
77 Security forces claimed an OPM group led by Daniel Awom killed nine people, including five paramilitary police in March 
and June 2001 as part of attacks on local logging, The attacks prompted a major security operation and the imprisonment 
of 27 people, but it was never clear who the attackers were. Amnesty International reported that no OPM groups claimed 
responsibility for the attacks and that “well informed local observers believe that if they were involved it was not members 
of the TPN command local to Wasior. There is some evidence that the attack may have been carried out by an armed group, 
possibly with links to the OPM/TPN from another district, but with military backing.” See Amnesty International, “Grave 
Human Rights Violations in Wasior, Papua”, AI Index 21/032/2002, September 2002.
78 A review of the incident by the serving provincial police commander concluded that police had only fired three warning 
shots into the air. “3 OPM Tewas, Polri Tingkatkan Pengamanan di Papua”, Okezone.com, 8 May 2013. See also Tito Kar-
navian, Guardian over the Land of the Cenderawasih, op. cit.
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of different generational, class and ethnic strands of Papuan society. While the first two believed 
they had more legitimacy because of their roots in older movements, including the armed OPM, 
the KNPB since 2008 has shown a far greater ability to mobilise protests in Papua.
On 26 June 2015, the MSG heads of state announced that they had accepted Indonesia as an 
associate member “representing the five Melanesian provinces in Indonesia” and the ULMWP 
as an observer, “representing Melanesians living abroad”.79 The decision is a diplomatic victory 
for Indonesia, and a product of intensive lobbying by the foreign affairs ministry in the months 
before the summit. It prevented recognition of the ULMWP as a representative of Papuans liv-
ing in Indonesia, which the ministry feared would amount to a tacit challenge to Indonesian 
sovereignty. While future MSG meetings will likely provide an opportunity for the ULMWP to 
challenge Jakarta’s Papua policy, upgrading Indonesia’s status has given Jakarta greater influence 
on the stance taken by the MSG as an organisation.80 The upgrade comes with assurances from 
Indonesia that it will continue to strengthen bilateral cooperation with and aid to the Melane-
sian countries.
A. Legacy of the Papuan Spring
The groups that now make up the ULMWP emerged in the mid-2000s, disillusioned with the 
prospects of political change in post-Soeharto Indonesia. All had shared in the euphoria of the 
“Papuan Spring”, a brief period of openness in 2000 during which many Papuans became con-
vinced that independence following the example of East Timor was possibleor at least that the 
relationship with Jakarta was on the verge of major change. 81  
The Papuan Spring gave rise to a series of dramatic events. In February 1999, only a month 
after President Habibie announced that East Timorese would be allowed to vote whether or not 
to stay part of Indonesia, a delegation of 100 Papuans presented Habibie with a list of demands 
that began with independence. Pro-independence activities increased throughout 2000, as did 
raisings of the Morning Star flag, which Habibie’s successor, President Abdurrahman Wahid, 
allowed as a cultural symbol until the military forced him to back down.  
In May and June 2000, with some funding provided by President Wahid, thousands of Papuans 
gathered in Jayapura for the Second Papuan Congress—the first having been held in October 
1961 under the Dutch colonial administration as the formal beginning of a short-lived process 
toward self-government. The Congress, which did not include any representatives of the armed 
factions, elected a 32-member Papua Presidium Council (Presidium Dewan Papua, PDP) that 
conservative elements in the government came to see as the driver of the independence move-
ment. It was headed by Theys Eluay, a leader who once had been close to the Indonesian military. 
In August 2000, unnerved by the prospect of increased separatism and still imbued with a 
commitment to reform, Indonesia’s highest legislative body, the People’s Consultative Assembly, 
decreed that both Aceh and Papua should be given special autonomy. Initially, much of the Pap-
uan elite held back, not wanting to compromise on independence.82 But after the Papuan Spring 
effectively ended in October 2000 with an outbreak of violence in Wamena, a few leaders saw 
special autonomy as a possible transition phase. 
A team from Cenderwasih University (Uncen) in Jayapura, produced a draft in April 2001 
79 See the communiqué of the 20th MSG Leaders’ Summit, Honiara, 26 June 2015, available at www.msgsec.info. The five are 
Papua, Papua Barat, Maluku, Maluku Utara and Nusa Tenggara Timur. Together they are home to just under 11 million 
people (2010 census figures). 
80 There has never before been an associate member at the MSG so the exact terms of Indonesia’s future participation remain 
unclear but it is expected it will have a greater voice it has an observer.
81 Human Rights Watch, “Indonesia: Violence and Political Impasse in Papua”, Vol. 13, No. 2, July 2001.
82 Rodd McGibbon, “Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?”, Policy Studies 10, East 
West Center, Washington, 2004.
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that included a provision for a Timor-like referendum after three years. As one scholar observed:
The drafting team made admirable efforts to conduct wide-ranging community 
consultations, but these efforts were undermined by Papuans’ deep-seated suspicion 
of autonomy. In attempting to elicit public input, the Uncen team met stiff opposi-
tion from key sectors of the community, particularly students, adat leaders, and the 
Presidium, who rejected any form of autonomy in favor of independence and main-
tained calls for a direct dialogue with Jakarta and the international community.83
The DPR passed a much watered-down version in November 2001, giving Papuans 25 years 
of special autonomy but without any mention of a referendum. Most lawmakers saw it as an im-
portant but final concession, but many Papuans viewed the 25 years as a trial period, after which 
they could reassess the benefits of Indonesian integration.84
In the midst of the debate over the law, President Wahid was impeached in July 2001 and a 
new administration headed by Megawati Soekarnoputri saw hardline nationalists and military 
figures in power once more in Jakarta. The 10 November 2001 killing of Theys Eluay by Kopas-
sus special forces overshadowed the passage of the special autonomy law twelve days later. By the 
end of 2001, the independence movement inside Papua was in disarray, without a clear leader 
or strategy. 
B. A New Generation of Political Groups, 2004-2012
Four groups eventually emerged to try and reunite the movement. Each has tried to create a 
representative structure that would bring it broader political legitimacy, and each has tried but 
largely failed to improve coordination with the armed factions as a way of increasing leverage 
with Jakarta.
1. The West Papua National Authority (WPNA) and the NRFPB
The establishment of a West Papua National Authority (WPNA) in 2004 was the first major ef-
fort to create a new umbrella political organisation following the collapse of the Papuan Spring. 
Founded by Edison Waromi, Jacob Rumbiak and Herman Wanggai—all ethnic Biak or Serui—
its membership is skewed heavily towards the northern coastal elite and its claims to broad rep-
resentativeness are dubious.85 At its inception in 2004, the WPNA named Richard Hans Yoweni 
as the head of its military wing, but he left the group in 2008, and the WPNA has had very little 
influence on any armed OPM operations since.
From the outset the WPNA has focused on achieving international recognition for what it 
claims is an existing “sovereign” nation of West Papua.86 In October 2011, it was one of several 
organisations that decided to convene a Third Papuan Congress to commemorate the fiftieth 
anniversary of the first in 1961, hoping to recreate the sense of unity that had marked the sec-
ond, at the height of the Papuan Spring. But the WPNA proved so opposed to the idea of others 
83 Ibid, p.19.
84 IPAC interview, member of the Tim 100, Jakarta, 21 February 2014.
85 Waromi and Wanggai are both ethnic Serui from the northern coast; Rumbiak is Biak. Wanggai and Rumbiak are now based 
in Australia. The WPNA is a successor to the Bintang 14 (Fourteen Stars) founded by American-educated Thomas Wang-
gai—Herman’s uncle—in the mid-1980s, from which it draws a large part of its membership. Wanggai’s movement, which 
aimed to establish the independent state of West Melanesia, sought to further distance the Papuan independence movement 
from its colonial roots by replacing the Morning Star flag, which uses the colours of the Dutch flag, with a Melanesian one. 
Thomas died in prison in 1996, but the Bintang-14 movement remains influential in some northern coastal areas. 
86 Members often refer to nineteen days of sovereignty that they say followed a 1 December 1961 declaration of nationhood 
and ended with Soekarno’s 19 December 1961 declaration of the Trikora military operations aimed at securing Indonesian 
control over the territory. See, for example, “AMP: 19 Desember 1961, Awal Operasi Militer Indonesia di Papua”, Majalah 
Selangkah, 19 December 2014.
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playing a leadership role that ultimately most other groups dropped out, deepening divisions. 
On 19 October, the Congress appointed WPNA head Forkorus Yaboisembut from Sentani pres-
ident of the “Federal Republic of West Papua” (Negara Republik Federal Papua Barat, NRFPB). 
The Congress was broken up violently by security forces. Hundreds of plainclothes police and 
army swarmed the field in Abepura where Congress participants had gathered and made some 
300 arrests; video footage shows them kicking and bashing participants. Three men fleeing the 
Congress were found dead the next morning from gunshot wounds. Forkorus and four others 
were arrested and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for rebellion. They were all released 
in July 2014.
The WPNA now insists that the leadership that it “inaugurated” at the Third Congress is the 
only official government of Papua and view themselves as the only legitimate Papuan represen-
tatives in any dialogue with Jakarta. 
The WPNA would be so small and eccentric as to be almost irrelevant, were it not for its link 
through Forkorus to the Papuan Adat Council (Dewan Adat Papua, DAP), a vast grassroots or-
ganisation with chapters across Papua at district level that play a role in regulating adat affairs. 
Forkorus’s role as DAP chair gives the WPNA greater reach and legitimacy. It has also reinforced 
Jakarta’s perception of the DAP as a pro-independence institution.
2. The West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL)
The West Papua National Council for Liberation (WPNCL) emerged as a competing umbrel-
la group for the independence movement after a 2005 meeting in Vanuatu organised by John 
Otto Ondawame, the former OPM Pemka fighter. Driven largely by the efforts of former OPM 
fighters living in exile, it gave a high priority to uniting the political and military wings of the 
independence movement. At the 2005 meeting, Mathias Wenda was appointed supreme com-
mander and it was agreed that the WPNCL would serve as a political wing of the OPM. None 
of the armed factions from the central highlands agreed, however; Goliat Tabuni’s men were 
apparently not invited, while representatives of Kelly Kwalik’s group refused to join.
In 2008, the WPNCL unilaterally replaced Wenda with northern coast-based Richard Hans 
Yoweni. Yoweni, believed to be the oldest active serving member of the OPM, was never seen as 
playing an active role in organisational affairs—that was left to Ondawame, the vice-chair, until 
his death from natural causes in November 2014.
As Yoweni’s influence has faded, the WPNCL’s focus has turned to mobilising international sup-
port for Papuan independence, particularly among Pacific island states. It has used Vanuatu, home 
to Ondawame and fellow WPNCL leader Rex Rumakiek for many years, as a base for launching its 
appeal to join the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), hoping to join one other non-state group, 
the New Caledonian Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (Front Libération National 
Kanak et Socialiste, FLNKS) as a member. An application by the WPNCL in 2013 failed when the 
organisation was deemed by MSG leaders to be insufficiently representative.87
3. Benny Wenda, the Free West Papua Campaign and its offshoots
The Free West Papua Campaign was established in the UK in the mid-2000s by Benny Wenda, 
87 In June 2013, MSG leaders voted to defer a decision on the WPNCL’s application and in January 2014, MSG foreign minis-
ters made a one-day visit to Jayapura on a fact-finding mission. The Vanuatu foreign minister objected to the mission and 
did not attend. At their June 2014 summit, MSG leaders rejected the membership bid but “agreed to invite all groups to 
form an inclusive and united umbrella group in consultation with Indonesia to work on submitting a fresh application”. See 
MSG Secretariat, “Communiqué—Special MSG Leaders’ Summit”, 26 June 2014.
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a Wamena-born activist from the highlander student movement.88 He was arrested in 2002 and 
accused of masterminding an attack on the Abepura police station that killed two police and 
one guard in December 2000—charges he has always denied. After an unusually speedy trial in 
Jayapura District Court, he was sentenced to 25 years in prison but on 27 October 2002, he es-
caped and fled to Papua New Guinea, where friends helped him get to the UK. There he received 
political asylum, and has been a thorn in the side of the Indonesian government ever since. 
Wenda is the most visible representative of the pro-independence campaign outside Indo-
nesia. The Free West Papua Campaign has become a significant fundraising channel with cam-
paigns at British shops such as the Lush soap products company. Wenda has toured the world 
giving speeches in support of independence, and in 2008 co-founded the International Parlia-
mentarians for West Papua (IPWP). A second group, International Lawyers for West Papua, was 
formed the following year. Both have small but steadily growing memberships, and their activ-
ities routinely bring protests from Indonesian embassies in the countries concerned. Groups in 
Papua, notably the KNPB, have arranged demonstrations at home to coincide with ILWP/IPWP 
events abroad, suggesting a level of coordination that Wenda and others publicly deny.
4. Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB)
The Komite Nasional Papua Barat (West Papua National Committee, KNPB), is the political 
movement’s radical fringe. Founded in late 2008 as an extension of the same highlander stu-
dent movement of which Benny Wenda was once part, its primary strategy is to lobby for an 
independence referendum through frequent demonstrations in Papuan cities. Its members have 
occasionally used or advocated violence, despite its claims to being a non-violent movement.89 
KNPB’s leaders are largely highlander, urban, educated men and women—but mostly men—
and it has worked to build a large network of grassroots supporters across Papua, drawing in 
part on the migration of highlanders to coastal centres such as Jayapura, Nabire, Biak and Ma-
nokwari. Since 2012, it has been led by Victor Yeimo, a Nabire native.90 
In an effort to support its grassroots organising, and as a response to the “state” structures 
announced by the WPNA, the KNPB in late 2011 began establishing what it called people’s par-
liaments at district level (parlemen rakyat daerah, PRD). The first of these was formally declared 
in Biak in July 2011; thirteen others had been created by January 2012.91 In April 2012, the group 
inaugurated a West Papua National Parliament (Parlemen Nasional West Papua, PNWP), which 
today consists of 23 local PRDs under the overall leadership of Buchtar Tabuni, who was until 
2012 the KNPB chairman.
Like the WNPA and WPNCL, KNPB has tried to build ties to armed OPM units, as evi-
denced by its role in organising of the May 2012 OPM summit in Biak that appointed Goliat 
Tabuni supreme commander. It has been no more successful, however: Goliat, believed to be 
over sixty, is said not to be interested in taking orders from younger men (most KNPB members 
are in their twenties, thirties and forties). There is no recent evidence of coordination between 
the two groups and Goliat has publicly refused to support the ULMWP.92 The KNPB has also 
88 Wenda had helped found the Dewan Musyawarah Masyarakat Koteka (Koteka Tribal Council, Demmak) in 2000, a high-
lander pro-independence group that is now largely defunct as the KNPB has garnered broader influence. See International 
Crisis Group, “Radicalisation and Dialogue”, Section 2, op.cit.
89 For more on the KNPB’s founding, see International Crisis Group, “Radicalisation and Dialogue”, op. cit.
90 Yeimo, born in Nabire, emerged as a leader of a series of different highlander student groups after studying in Surabaya in 
the early 2000s, including the Front Pepera and the Aliansi Mahasiswa Papua (AMP). He became one of the leading pro-
ponents within the KNPB for a more violent approach, including an April 2009 attack on the Abepura police station. See 
“Radicalisation and Dialogue”, op. cit.
91 In first establishing a council in Biak, the KNPB was following the model of the Dutch in establishing the New Guinea 
Council; the first local council had been established in Biak in 1959.
92 See for example indonesiatimurvoice.blogdetik.com/2015/03/31/papua-panglima-tpnopm-tidak-dukung-ulmwp/.
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tried to move into and radicalise areas like Biak where the WPNA and WPNCL had historic ties, 
again taking advantage of the steady migration of highlanders to the coast.
The KNPB’s links to violence distinguish it from most other political groups. KNPB’s leaders 
have spoken of the need to create an “emergency zone” (zona darurat) in Papua in which high 
levels of violence and human rights violations by state security forces would hasten international 
intervention.93 They have thereby consciously adopting the strategy that in their view worked 
for East Timor. KNPB protests have sometimes included incitement to violence, particularly 
against migrant businesses. In mid-2012, police linked a series of shootings that began in May 
and killed six migrants and one German tourist in the Jayapura area to Mako Tabuni, then dep-
uty chairman of the KNPB.94 They alleged that the murders followed a shift in strategy by Mako, 
who they say held a meeting on 8 May 2012 of some KNPB followers and announced a “civilian 
militant” strategy in which KNPB members would start burning down government and private 
buildings, and killing non-Papuans.95 Mako was shot during his attempted arrest on 12 June 
2012 and later died, reportedly for lack of treatment.96 
Police have since repeatedly accused KNPB of planning a bombing campaign, but while 
members have been convicted of explosives possession, no evidence of the campaign, allegedly 
planned at the May 2012 summit in Biak, has been forthcoming. Then in September 2012, two 
small explosions occurred in Wamena, Jayawijaya district. Nineteen men linked to the KNPB 
were arrested in the weeks that followed for possession of bomb-making materials—two in Biak, 
ten in Wamena and seven in Timika.97 In April 2013, the Timika men were convicted of weapons 
possession but acquitted of rebellion. The Wamena case appears not to have gone to trial. Alle-
gations of bomb-making plots returned in July 2014, following the arrest of a group of eighteen 
activists who police say were organising a boycott of the presidential elections. Thirteen were 
released, but the remaining five were charged with conspiracy to disrupt the presidential poll 
with Molotov cocktails.98 A trial began in November 2014 and was still ongoing in August 2015.
Police have routinely denied the KNPB permission to demonstrate, and KNPB demonstra-
tions that do go ahead have often resulted in arrests. Under a 1998 Law on the Freedom to 
Demonstrate, anyone planning a demonstration must register with the police 72 hours in ad-
vance.99 In a section on responsibilities of those demonstrating, the law says they must uphold 
national unity and integrity. Police say that this disqualifies most protests by the KNPB because, 
by expressing support for independence, they are challenging the unity of the state.100 
Responding in 2013 to complaints from the KNPB and others that this policy was limiting 
the freedom of expression, then provincial police commander Tito Karnavian tried to engage 
with the KNPB to explain what was and was not allowed, for example by hosting a “coffee morn-
ing” at the police headquarters in Jayapura in May 2013, which Buchtar Tabuni and others at-
tended.101 Karnavian explained that a number of practices common to KNPB demonstrations—
shutting down the main Jayapura-Abepura road, upon which almost all the city’s traffic relies; 
93 See International Crisis Group, “Dynamics of Violence in Papua”, op. cit.
94 Ibid., Section II.  
95 Pengadilan Tinggi Jayapura, Decision Number 07/PID/2013/PT.JPR, 21 March 2013.
96 Police claimed that Mako had tried to grab an officer’s gun and that they were shooting in self-defence. 
97 “3 Kg Bahan Peledak Ditemukan Lagi di Wamena”, Cenderawasih Pos, 18 October 2012; “Polisi Amankan Bom dan Sajam 
di Timika”, Cenderawasih Pos, 22 October 2012. See also “Dua Bom untuk Pemerintah, Polisi, dan TNI di Papua”, Kompas, 
30 September 2012.
98 “Yosep Siep Dkk, Terdakwa kasus Pisugi Wamena Menjalani Sidang Pertama”, Aliansi Demokrasi untuk Papua (AlDP), 26 
November 2014.
99 Undang-Undang 9/2008 tentang Kemerdekaan Menyampaikan Pendapat di Muka Umum. 
100 The law’s explanatory articles explain the drafters wanted to avoid demonstrations that would include attacks or incite 
hatred based on race, ethnicity or religion. KNPB protests have in the past included calls to action that could be considered 
incitement to violence against migrants. 
101 “Buchtar: Kami Tetap Berjuang Papua Merdeka”, Bintang Papua, 22 May 2013.
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forcibly gathering money from local shopkeepers and residents; inciting violence or slandering 
others—were also illegal.102 Demonstrations were tolerated if confined to specific areas, but the 
KNPB is not an organisation that looks for ways to adhere to the law and Karnavian’s succes-
sor, Yotje Mende, was less permissive. In March 2015, Mende claimed that all meetings held by 
members of the organisation, whether public or private, were illegal at because the KNPB was 
not registered with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. 
In addition to Mako Tabuni, several KNPB leaders have been killed in unclear circumstances. 
In December 2012, a local KNPB leader in Wamena, Hubertus Mabel, was shot dead while al-
legedly resisting arrest.103 A police account later tied Hubertus to the Pirime police station attack 
by Puron Wenda’s group; but he had also been named on a list of five other suspects wanted in 
connection to the alleged bomb-making plot since October of that year.104 On 26 August 2014, 
the body of a KNPB leader in Sorong was found floating at sea with his arms and legs bound and 
tied up in a sack. He had gone missing a week earlier just before a visit to Sorong by then Pres-
ident Yudhoyono. There appears to have been no investigation into his death—had one gone 
ahead, it might have put paid to allegations by KNPB members that he was killed by intelligence, 
or provided the basis for the prosecution of his killers.105
In spite of these deaths and continued arrests, KNPB has displayed striking staying power. 
Far more than any other political organisation in Papua, it has the ability to mobilise large num-
bers of supporters—over 1,000 at some urban demonstrations, and sometimes in several cities 
at once—often on short notice. This makes it a formidable partner in any broader movement.
C. The Formation of the ULMWP: A United Agenda?
On 6 December 2014, the WPNA, the WPNCL and the KNPB put aside their differences to 
establish the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP).106 The immediate impe-
tus for the reconciliation was provided by the potential for a second bid for MSG membership 
following the 2013 deferral of the WPNCL’s application. The Vanuatu political leadership, which 
has taken an active interest in the Papuan separatist movement since the 1990s, also expended 
considerable political effort. Former Vanuatu PM Barak Sopétook a personal interest along with 
the Vanuatu Council of Chiefs, which communicated to the Papuan side that only if the three 
groups came together would MSG membership be considered.
The ULMWP has its roots in an older process, the Papua Peace Network (Jaringan Damai 
Papua, JDP) which it may now eclipse. JDP is a civil society network that emerged in 2009 with 
the aim of sponsoring a dialogue within Indonesia about what a peaceful Papua (Papua Tanah 
Damai) might look like. It included Papuans and activists from Jakarta and other parts of Indo-
nesia, and while it started from the premise that any dialogue would take part within the frame-
work of autonomy and recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, it was formed without prejudice 
to where anyone stood on the independence issue. 
A key turning point in JDP’s development was a July 2011 Peace Conference in Jayapura, held 
to set an agenda for dialogue between Jakarta and Papua in the interests of resolving grievances 
102 See also “Kapolda: Silahkan Bicara dalam Batas-Batas Toleransi”, Tabloid Jubi, 9 August 2013.
103 Another man, Natalis Alua, whose level of affiliation with the KNPB was unclear, was also shot in the same incident and 
died a few days later. 
104 See Karnavian, Guardian over the Land of the Cenderawasih, op.cit. p. 5.
105 One obstacle to an effective investigation was the family’s refusal to allow an autopsy, a frequent occurrence. “Ketua KNPB 
Sorong Tewas Misterius Ini Kronologinya”, Majalah Selangkah, 28 August 2014.
106 See the Saralana Declaration, 6 December 2014, Port Vila, Vanuatu. The Declaration was signed by Edison Waromi, on 
behalf of the NRFPB (here a proxy for the WPNA); Rex Rumakiek, on behalf of the WPNCL; and Buchtar Tabuni, on behalf 
of the West Papua National Parliament (a proxy for the KNPB). 
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and ending violence.107 In a surprise move at the end of the conference, it named five people who 
would serve as JDP’s “negotiators” if and when dialogue commenced. All five were staunchly 
pro-independence Papuans from the diaspora: Benny Wenda; Octovianus Mote, a former jour-
nalist who received asylum in the U.S. in 2000; Leonie Tanggahma, the daughter of an OPM 
envoy who lived in Senegal in the 1970s and is now based in the Netherlands; Jacob Rumbiak, 
from the WPNA; and John Ondawame. Their appointment seemed to suggest that JDP itself was 
pro-independence. The government of President Yudhoyono, which had sent a senior official 
from Jakarta to open the conference, was furious. 
The five negotiators now form the secretariat of the ULMWP.108 The chair of the secretari-
at, Octovianus Mote, was instrumental in making the ULMWP happen.109 He is not formally 
aligned with any of the three groups, something that has probably made him more acceptable to 
all of them; he has also kept in close contact with representatives of all groups through Facebook 
and Skype. Benny Wenda has been appointed the group’s spokesman. 
D. Impact of the ULMWP
The advent of the ULMWP has taken the agenda for dialogue on independence outside the 
framework of the JDP and grafted it onto a movement with strong grassroots appeal and the 
ability to mobilise across large parts of Papua. Its short-term mission of full MSG membership 
has failed, but securing observer status has given a new confidence and coherence to the pro-in-
dependence movement within Papua.  
The announcement of the ULMWP quickly led to both a dramatic uptick in the number of 
demonstrations and protests by the KNPB and its partners, as well as an aggressive escalation 
in the police response. While the survival of a united front remains tenuous, the three groups 
are already presenting a more coordinated strategy at home. 110 They have agreed, for example 
that the KNPB now plays the coordinating role in organising public protest. One focus of these 
demonstrations has been fundraising, both to support the MSG bid and to send relief to Vanuatu 
following a deadly typhoon there. Police have forcibly broken up many of these fundraising ac-
tivities, presumably suspecting that the money raised is not going just to humanitarian causes.111
Protests around 1 May 2015—an annual focus for pro-independence actions—saw an un-
precedented number of arrests across Papua.112 Nearly 240 demonstrators who turned out in 
support of the KNPB and to support the ULMWP bid were briefly detained in Manokwari, with 
44 more arrested in Jayapura and Merauke.113 Arrests continued in advance of the MSG Summit 
and an informal leaders’ meeting due to take place around 20 May. According to Amnesty Inter-
national, over 100 KNPB activists were arrested on 20-21 May in Manokwari, Biak and Jayapura; 
at least 90 were arrested in further protests between 26 May and 3 June in and around Jayapura 
and in the central highlands.114 Most were quickly released, but at least six were charged with 
107 See International Crisis Group, “Hope and Hard Reality in Papua”, op.cit.
108 Ondawame died in November 2014 and was replaced by Jacob Rumbiak. 
109 A former Kompas correspondent in Jayapura, he played a key role in setting up the platform of the Team 100 sent to meet 
with President Habibie in 1999. After facing death threats, Mote fled the country not long after and sought asylum in the 
U.S., where he has continued to lobby for Papuan independence.
110 See for example “PNWP, NRFPB dan WPNCL Resmi Sosialisasikan Hasil ULMWP”, Tabloid Jubi, 2 March 2015.There 
have been some notable dissenters, such as NRFPB “President” Forkorus Yaboisembut, who has refused to recognise the 
front, even though his own group is a member.
111 See, for example, reporting on a series of incidents in Yahukimo in March 2015 where KNPB sources say one activist was 
killed and five injured as a result of police gunfire. “KNPB: Polda Papua Bertanggungjawab Terhadap Enam Warga Sipil 
yang Ditembak di Yahukimo”, Tabloid Jubi, 24 March 2015.
112 The day commemorates the 1 May 1963 handover of administrative control of Papua from the UN transitional administra-
tion to the Indonesian government.
113 “Puluhan Anggota KNPB Diamankan di Sejumlah Daerah”, Cenderawasih Pos, 2 May 2015.
114 Amnesty International, “Indonesia: End mass arbitrary arrests of peaceful protesters in Papua”, 11 June 2015.
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incitement for their role in the demonstrations. 
As for the dialogue process that JDP began, it could go one of two ways. The rise of the ULM-
WP may further cool any interest in Jakarta in anything that suggests a formal discussion.115 On 
the other hand, the clear pro-independence platform of ULMWP might position JDP as a more 
attractive interlocutor, but only if it can distance itself from the former.   
Some in the Papuan elite are hopeful that the ULMWP’s observer status means that MSG 
meetings will provide a useful forum for exchange between the group and Indonesia.116 This 
seems unlikely. Indonesia is expected to be represented by five governors and the foreign affairs 
ministry. Neither Papua province Governor Lukas Enembe nor Papua Barat Governor Abra-
ham Atururi has shown any interest in engaging with the ULMWP; representatives of the three 
other provinces—Maluku, North Maluku and Nusa Tenggara Timur—will have little to discuss 
as there is no pan-Melanesian movement or identity within Indonesia. Meanwhile, Mote and 
Wenda have been clear that they are interested only in discussing Papuans’ right to self-determi-
nation, which is a non-starter for Jakarta.
VIII.  SOLUTIONS
If the OPM is not going away and indeed has access to new weapons and income, while the po-
litical movement despite all efforts to suppress or co-opt it appears to have grown stronger, what 
are the Jokowi government’s options?
The first is to address the factors that exacerbate anti-Jakarta sentiment, to ensure that pol-
icies or practices do not inadvertently strengthen the movement. The second is to work out 
a containment strategy that would avoid crackdowns on non-violent political groups without 
doing anything to encourage their growth.
Four practices stand out as contributing to radicalisation: ineffective policing, impunity for 
security forces, administrative fragmentation and undermining local institutions. There are 
many others, related to land, in-migration and development, but these four can serve as exam-
ples.
1. Ineffective policing. Every time a Papuan is shot by police—in a demonstration, an op-
eration or in the course of arrest—the political temperature rises. The latest example comes 
from Karubaga, Tolikara where police shooting on 17 July 2015 exacerbated violence between 
Christians and Muslims, when a little preventive work could have defused communal tensions 
days earlier.117 Security forces everywhere in Indonesia need to move away from opening fire 
as the stock response to crowd control, but nowhere is the need greater than in Papua. Former 
provincial police chief Tito Karnavian understood the problem and wrote a book on the need to 
maintain intensive communication with community leaders, anticipate problems and rotate out 
115 JDP-government meetings are continuing, and JDP members saw the attendance of former Coordinating Minister for Se-
curity, Political and Legal Affairs Tedjo Edy Purdijatno at a February exploratory meeting as an encouraging sign. President 
Jokowi himself seems unclear about its utility. A series of new internal dialogues are planned in Papua with the aim of gen-
erating more support. But on his 9 May 2015 visit to Jayapura, Jokowi told reporters: “There is no longer any issue in Papua. 
What’s dialogue for? I have already come here repeatedly, spoken with adat and religious leaders, bupati, mayors—I’ve 
talked to them all. So what is that if not dialogue?” See “Jokowi: Di Papua Sudah Tidak Ada Masalah, Dialog Untuk Apa?”, 
Tabloid Jubi, 12 May 2015 (IPAC translation).
116 See also Budi Hernawan, “Contesting Melanesia: The summit and dialogue”, Jakarta Post, 8 July 2015.
117 One man was killed and eleven adults injured when security forces shot at a crowd of Papuans in Karubaga, where predom-
inantly non-Papuan migrant Muslims had gathered in front of the district military command (Koramil) to hold prayers 
marking the end of Ramadan, the fasting month. Angered by the shooting, local residents set fire to small kiosks nearby, 
most, but not all, owned by migrants. The fire spread, burning down 58 kiosks as well as the small local mosque. Police 
appear to have taken very little action following the circulation of a letter one month earlier by the local GIDI church 
leadership that forbade local Muslims from worshipping outside or using loudspeakers, which the church argued would 
interfere with a major gathering they were holding on the same dates.  
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under-performing personnel.118 He also stressed the need for changing the incentive structure 
so the best police officers, not the worst, are assigned to Papua. The book’s “lessons learned” 
section does not seem to have had much impact, however. Improving the performance of the 
police in Papua may be one of the best investments the Jokowi government could make toward 
ensuring that unnecessary use of force does not further fuel the independence movement. 
2. Impunity for security forces. Papuan casualties at the hands of security forces are only occa-
sionally investigated and punished, and the more senior the officer involved, the less the chance 
there seems to be of serious prosecution. Deaths of members of the OPM or KNPB are often 
explained as resulting from the victim pulling a gun or knife, resisting arrest or trying to flee—
the default responses that no longer have any credibility, even if in a few cases they may be true. 
When multiple unarmed civilians are involved, the political cost of failing to resolve killings 
is even higher, particularly if the government promises action and then does not deliver. The 
Paniai killings in December 2014 are a case in point. Four people were killed when security 
forces were called in to stop a protest that arose after local teenagers grew angry at a military car 
speeding through their village at night. At least two separate investigations have been opened 
into the shootings, but no results have been made public, despite repeated pledges by the pres-
ident. The failure to fully investigate and prosecute security personnel suspected of crimes or 
excessive or negligent use of force fuels resentment and adds to the pro-independence narrative 
of oppression.
3. Fragmented local government. The division of Papua into smaller and smaller local govern-
ment units—called pemekaran in Indonesia—is increasing the likelihood of electoral or ethnic 
conflict that the OPM can exploit as well as providing new sources of protection fees for local 
OPM units. Nowhere has pemekaran been more pronounced than in Papua: between 1999 and 
2014, one province became two and the number of districts grew from ten to 43.119 The impact 
of this uncontrolled division is weaker, indeed frequently absentee local governments, with little 
capacity to provide services. Pemekaran thus manages to benefit three constituencies: conser-
vative nationalists, especially in the intelligence agencies, who aim to weaken the independence 
movement through divide-and-rule tactics; local elites and their extended clans who can secure 
major spoils through access to government resources; and, in some areas of the highlands, the 
independence movement itself. Halting pemekaran would simultaneously improve governance, 
lower the risk of conflict and stop new flows of cash to local guerrilla leaders.
4. Undermining local institutions. One policy that has also fuelled resentment has been the 
creation of institutions designed to compete with or undermine institutions seen as sympathetic 
to independence. This is particularly true of adat institutions. Adat, or customary law, remains 
an important organising principle in Papuan cultural, political and economic life. In some areas, 
there has been overlap between membership of the OPM, pro-independence groups and adat 
bodies, as the case of Forkorus Yaboisembut illustrates. To counter the influence of the organi-
sation he leads, the Papua Adat Council (Dewan Adat Papua, DAP), the government has since 
2000 supported the growth of a parallel institution, the Lembaga Masyarakat Adat (LMA).120 Its 
members wear government uniforms and its composition is subject to the review of home affairs 
officials. Official government processes that by law require adat consultation, such as verifying 
which candidates for governor are considered indigenous Papuan, are referred to the LMA and 
not the DAP. The effect of this is to render legal recognition of adat, once considered an import-
ant political and cultural concession, meaningless. Instead of helping to counter pro-indepen-
dence sentiment, the LMA has stoked it.
118 M. Tito Karnavian, Guardian Over the Land of the Cenderawasih, op. cit.
119 See IPAC Report No. 3, Carving Up Papua, op.cit.
120 In May 2015, the chairman of the Papua province LMA, Lenis Kogoya, was appointed a special adviser on Papua in the 
president’s office. 
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If the Jokowi government was willing to apply the principle of “do no harm” to confronting 
its separatist problem, it could work to identify policies such as those above whose impact is the 
opposite of what was intended, and then take steps to address them. Development policies are 
beyond the scope of this paper, but it should just be noted that while progress towards improv-
ing development standards in Papua is undoubtedly a good thing, it is not necessarily going 
to win Jakarta greater sympathy, let alone reduce support for independence. As East Timor 
showed, development does not necessarily bring gratitude. This raises the question of whether a 
limited modus vivendi with the non-violent political movement is possible. (If there is any such 
coexistence in operation at the moment, it is ironically between local officials and the armed 
movement.) Jakarta would have no interest in a policy that gave these groups more space, but it 
might have in a policy that did not gratuitously antagonise them. 
It could take several forms: 
• Talking, but not negotiating, on the principle that developing personal relationships is 
almost always constructive. The MSG decision offers an interesting format here, through 
which diaspora pro-independence leaders of the ULMWP will have a chance to interact 
with the governors of Papua and West Papua. That exchange should be encouraged. 
• Ending the use of makar as a charge for non-violent crime. If members of pro-inde-
pendence groups commit vandalism, assault, fraud, incitement to violence or any oth-
er non-political crime listed in the Criminal Code, they should be open to prosecution, 
but makar—a crime that only elevates the status of those arrested to political prisoners—
would be reserved for armed fighters. Stopping the use of makar as a charge would go 
some way toward addressing a concern of politically active Papuans that they are always 
under attack for being separatists, even for mobilising around political issues that have 
nothing to do with advocating independence but are about improving Papuans’ welfare.
• Eliminating institutional incentives for military commanders and others to arrange the 
“surrender” of self-identified OPM fighters. These staged surrenders may be intended 
to produce public relations wins for the government and financial bonuses for the com-
manders in question, but they have never made a serious dent in the movement and serve 
mostly to breed cynicism and resentment. The publicly-feted embrace of the Indonesian 
state by OPM founder Nicolaas Jouwe is a case in point. He returned from the Nether-
lands at the age of 87, after living abroad for almost half a century, and though he has no 
relevance at all to the current political movement, he is produced to meet almost all offi-
cial foreign visitors to Papua as proof that top independence leaders can be persuaded to 
change their minds.
• Proceeding with amnesties for non-violent political prisoners. The benefit to the Indone-
sian government is from the message of good will such an action sends, not necessarily 
from the gratitude or loyalty of the individuals involved. Swearing loyalty oaths should not 
be a condition of release, especially since those committed to returning to the movement 
will do so whether or not they swear an oath.
IX. CONCLUSION
Fifty years after the birth of the independence movement in Papua, it is time for the Indonesian 
government to acknowledge that while managing the pro-independence movement is going to 
be a long-term challenge, trying to eliminate it may only be counterproductive. 
While OPM may have new income sources, there are no signs that it is getting any stronger. 
It remains a motley collection of different groups that mostly come together along ethnic lines, 
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with the political context in which they operate differing greatly from district to district. The 
political movement has overcome these divisions only to a limited extent with the creation of 
the UMLWP, and almost certainly temporarily, if past history is any indication. The KNPB re-
mains dominated by young highlanders. It does not speak for all of Papua, even if it manages to 
mobilise large numbers onto the streets.
Papua badly needs sustained attention from Jakarta, in a way that looks at all the needs and 
problems of both provinces as a whole. Many issues that seem to have no link to politics—
road-building, election administration, investment projects—if poorly implemented can have 
serious political consequences, while policies designed explicitly to weaken separatism can 
inadvertently fuel it.
President Jokowi has made Papua a particular focus of his presidency. If he can work toward 
some form of peaceful co-existence with groups that are not going to go away, he might succeed 
where his predecessors have failed in reorienting the relationship between Papua and the central 
government.
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Appendix A: Map of Papua and Papua Barat Provinces
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KNPB Komite Nasional Papua Barat
MSG Melanesian Spearhead Group
NRFPB Negara Republik Federal Papua Barat (Federal Republic of West Papua)
ULMWP United Liberation Movement for West Papua
WPNA West Papua National Authority
WPNCL West Papua National Coalition for Liberation
Appendix B: Glossary
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INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)
The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle 
that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission 
is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who 
benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive 
change. 
In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful 
settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance 
to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, elec-
toral, vigilante, extremist and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several 
forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-es-
tablished contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written 
documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, 
with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.
We are registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs in Jakarta as the Foundation for 
Preventing International Crises (Yayasan Penanggulangan Krisis Internasional); our website 
is www.understandingconflict.org. This report was funded in part by grants from the Asia 
Foundation and the Foundation to Promote Open Society; the views expressed here do not 
necessarily represent those of either organisation.
